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SEXUAL LABOR AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Berta E. Herndndez-Truyol and Jane E. Larson*
I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article, we engage the current human rights debate
that dichotomizes prostitution either as a modern form of slavery or
as the exercise of the right to work. This framework effectively sets
up a coercion/consent polarity. These poles raise fundamental human
rights issues; both the prohibition against slavery and the right to
work are matters addressed by and central to the international
human rights paradigm. Yet we argue in this Article that the human
rights issues raised by prostitution cannot properly be studied nor
moved towards meaningful resolution in the context of the prevailing
polarity. Prostitution in its current forms rightfully can be
understood as having aspects both of work and of servitude.
We propose instead that a labor paradigm is the proper
human rights model for the study of prostitution. Prostitution can be
analyzed by applying internationally-embraced labor rights outside
of the coercion/consent binary without denying women agency or
moralistically condemning all commercial sex. A labor analysis
permits deconstruction of the practice of prostitution and unearths
its component elements. Such practice, when scrutinized through the
lens of the labor framework, leads us to conclude that prostitution
* Berta E. Hernndez-Truyol is Levin, Mabie & Levin Professor of Law at
the University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law. Jane E. Larson is Voss-
Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School. Parts of
this article were presented to audiences at the University of Denver Law School,
the University of California at Davis Law School, and the Thomas Jefferson
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collaborative work between Linda R. Hirshman and Jane E. Larson in Hard
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should be decriminalized.
However, this conclusion brings little new to the existing
debate. Decriminalization, and even legalization, has been endorsed
by participants in the human rights debate for years.' This new
perspective allows us to explore a set of questions that are difficult to
address when approached from the combined focus on consent or
coercion. A key question that the new perspective allows us to
explore is whether even voluntary prostitution is a derogation of
human dignity and capability. That is, does even voluntary
prostitution impair the fundamental activities that provide a person
the reason to value her life, such as rest and restoration, practical
reason and learning, or intimacy? Such a focus on human
development and capability has taken hold in the consideration of
children's labor rights as human rights. Certain categories of work
are absolutely prohibited for children as "the worst forms of
exploitation," including sex work. We propose a similar inquiry into
adult prostitution framed around the question of exploitative labor
and measured by a standard of human capability.
This project began with our frustration that the debate in
human rights venues over prostitution is so stunted. In the present
and the past, feminists and other human rights activists have
analyzed prostitution as an act either of deviation or coercion in
order to resist the legitimation of a market in sex. The prostitute is a
bad woman, or she is a tool exploited by others through duress and
violence.2 By either version, she is not working in the sex industry by
reason of free choices that warrant respect grounded in her
personhood. The countering reaction from those who advocate
legalization or legitimation of sex work has been an effort to restore
normalcy, agency, and choice to the sex worker, insisting that she is
acting from rational economic motives. Like most others, she
1. See infra text accompanying notes 32-42.
2. Terminology is a place of conflict in this debate. There are those who
argue that one should never be called a "prostitute" as if one's identity is
encompassed by this status, but rather a "prostituted" person, that is, someone
subject to an act of violence or dispossession by another. Likewise, there is
resistance to using the terms "patron" or "customer" instead of "john," or the
terms "sex trade" or "sex workers," because using them means taking the position
that prostitution is a job rather than an act of dispossession. For examples of
these arguments over language, compare Sheila Jeffreys, The Idea of Prostitution
3-5 (1998), with Global Sex Workers: Rights, Resistance, and Redefinition 3
(Kamala Kempadoo & Jo Doezema eds., 1998). We appreciate the importance of
these distinctions, but because our position embraces aspects of both sides of
these disputes, we use all of these terms interchangeably throughout this article.
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(assuming an adult, not a child) must labor for her sustenance, and
sexual labor is as good a work as most others available to the
laboring class, particularly women. As these poles of coercion and
consent have worked to structure the prevailing discourse, these are
mutually exclusive positions.
This polarization misrepresents the social realities of
prostitution. But more important for our purposes, these staked-out
positions create no space for critical or transformative politics. Thus,
in Part II, we propose a paradigmatic transition to a labor paradigm
that transcends the polarity. It creates space for dialogue, but also
for political and policy innovation.
Part II(A) sets out the history of prostitution, the so-called
"world's oldest occupation," which long has been a contested issue in
domestic law. But globalization has transformed the market in sex
just as it has other markets. Sex tourism and trafficking are only the
most evident effects of a globalized sexual commerce. Internal
migration from rural to urban areas with disruption of traditional
household structures, the movement of women into waged labor in
free-trade zones, and the pressures on developing country economies
from international trading and financial structures all contribute to
more women and girls moving into sex work throughout the world.
In Part II(B), we thus question the dichotomy of the current
human rights debate in which prostitution must be seen either as a
condition of bondage, to which only first generation civil and political
rights apply,3 or as work, to which only second generation social and
economic rights apply.4 In Part II(C), "Reframing the Debate," we
begin with the crucial insight that sexual labor, like other forms of
work, can be exploited. Arguing from such a perspective, we propose
that even where prostitution is chosen by an adult woman as a form
of work, it may be an intolerably exploitative form of labor analogous
to sweatshop, child, or bonded labor, and subject to the same legal
and political pressures for extinction or transformation. Such
exploitative abuses of workers demonstrate that labor rights are
human rights, and should be enforced as such.
As Part III, "The Right to Work v. Human Rights-A False
Dichotomy," shows, this dichotomy is inconsistent as a structure of
analysis with established norms that treat labor as part of the
human rights framework, and that treat economic and social rights
3. See infra text accompanying notes 30, 31, 56.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 32-42, 55.
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as indivisible from and interdependent with civil and political rights.
Further, it ignores the powerful fusion of human and labor rights
concerns in emergent political movements around the world to
oppose sweatshops, child labor, and various forms of enslaved,
bonded, and indentured labor. That labor is an indivisible part of the
fabric of fundamental human rights is already a political and legal
fact; yet the implications of this fusion have been little explored in
the debate over sexual labor.
In Part IV, "How Is Work Different from Bondage?-
Deconstructing the Voluntariness/Consent Idea," we examine the
genealogy of the consent/coercion polarity, locating it within classical
liberal political theory, but see it applied with peculiar force in the
foundational political struggle in the West against race-based
slavery. The abolitionist movement criticized the labor relation of
slavery by counterposing free labor grounded in the wage labor
contract. By this rhetorical juxtaposition, the presence of the wage
labor contract, which manifests the worker's consent, obscures any
reality of exploitation or bondage. Contract (that is, consent) came to
negate bondage.
Following emancipation, nineteenth-century labor radicals
and feminists used slavery as the metaphor by which to describe
conditions of bondage imposed by that supposed instrument of
freedom, the contract. Not only wage labor, but also marriage and
prostitution, were suspect relations by this analysis.5 Although
created by contract, these relations, as actually experienced, seemed
to reconstruct the dispossession and exploitation associated with
chattel slavery. From this political heritage, we have taken an idea of
"voluntary bondage." We extend the idea into the present to describe
relations within which an individual consents to conditions of labor
that cannot be reconciled with human dignity.
The nineteenth- and twentieth-century responses in the
United States to these critiques of "wage slavery" and "white
(meaning sexual) slavery" was, on the one hand, the criminalization
of prostitution as an unfree relation marked off from the wage labor
contract. The other response was the creation of an elaborate body of
labor law that made the wage labor contract different from any other
5. See generally Amy Dru Stanley, From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor,
Marriage, and the Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation (1998) (exploring the
problem of contracts for wage labor, marriage, and prostitution, as well as the
role of contracts in the debates over freedom and slavery in nineteenth-century
America).
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contract for the sale of goods in the market. That distinction remains
true today. The wage labor contract is subject to baseline rules below
which no worker, however disempowered, should fall. Each check on
contract freedom reflects the conviction that labor is not just another
good circulating in commerce, and is also an implicit recognition that
contract alone cannot prevent bondage. In short, labor law is a
repository of the critical view of contract as one means of establishing
relations of bondage.
From within the labor perspective, as Part V, "Beyond
Consent: Substantively Just Labor Standards," explains, our analysis
makes several key theoretical moves. First, we can recognize the
economic motivation/compulsion that leads women to prostitution
while continuing to critically examine the labor relation of
prostitution. This also allows us to acknowledge how similar rather
than dissimilar sex work is to the labor performed by other exploited
workers. Second, the labor "eye" restores agency to women and, at
the same time, frees us from the claim that consent necessarily
creates legitimacy. A sex worker's consent does not legitimate
conditions of work that are otherwise incompatible with her human
dignity. We may accept that a laborer is making the best choice she
can and still acknowledge that she lacks the bargaining power to
insist upon standards of decent work.
By clearing away these prior issues, we can finally begin to
ask the question at the heart of emerging global political movements
and nascent human rights standards addressing exploitative labor.
Labor measures the legitimacy of work not by the presence of
contract or worker consent, but rather by substantive ethical and
moral standards of what conditions of work accord with the dignity,
health, and liberty of the worker. Workers have the right as well as
the need to labor for their sustenance, but they may not be asked to
do so in conditions that strip them of basic human rights.
Within the United States, the criminalization of prostitution
took sex work out of the debate over voluntary versus involuntary
labor. Prostitutes, like others who labor in the illegal and informal
economies, are instead blamed for the conditions of their labor. As
blameworthy, they may be targeted for moral condemnation, social
exclusion, and legal penalty. As reframed within a labor discourse,
and as our call for empiricism (Part VI) reveals, the right political
debate should not be around the "essential nature" either of sex work
or of the prostitute, but instead around what constitutes just and
humane conditions of labor. We conclude that it is time for renewed
vigor in the debate over the substantive question of what makes
20061
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labor a just relation. This Article cannot answer this question, but
aims to point to the questions that must be asked and answered,
using sexual labor as our frame.
II. TOWARDS A PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION
The legal status of prostitution is an unsettled issue in
nations throughout the world, particularly those of the West. Before
the mid-nineteenth century, in both common and civil law systems,
prostitution was regarded as immoral but not consistently treated as
a serious offense against law.6 In the era of slave emancipation in the
West, however, the moral debate over prostitution shifted to the legal
arena. All aspects of prostitution became the subject of legal reform
in western countries, and that debate was carried from domestic
politics to the emerging arena of international law.7 This resulted in
the adoption of international agreements and conventions aimed at
eradicating the cross-boundary trade in human sexual labor (known
as trafficking) and condemning prostitution as a practice akin to
slavery and violence! These international agreements rested upon at
6. Prostitution was originally identified in U.S. law as a type of sexual
promiscuity and prosecuted as a species of vagrancy. See Gary Dunin & Richard
Robinson, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status
Criminality, 37 N.Y. L. Rev. 102, 110 (1962). There was no requirement that
money change hands. For example, in 1908, the Supreme Court decided in Bitty,
and stated in dictum, that prostitution "refers to women who, for hire or without
hire, offer their bodies to indiscriminate intercourse with men." United States v.
Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 401 (1908). However, beginning in the 1910s and 1920s, U.S.
states consistently began to require pecuniary gains for prosecution as a
prostitute. Linda R. Hirshman & Jane E. Larson, Hard Bargains: The Politics of
Sex 176-77 (1998).
7. On early international anti-prostitution activism, see Jeffreys, supra
note 2; David J. Pivar, Purity Crusade: Sexual Morality and Social Control, 1868-
1900 (1973).
8. Two international instruments concerning the trade in women were
created early in the twentieth century, the International Agreement for the
Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, Mar. 18, 1904, 1 L.N.T.S. 83, 97 B.F.S.P.
95, and the International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave
Traffic, May 4, 1910, 211 Consol. T.S. 45, 103 B.F.S.P. 244. The first focused on
the trafficking of women and girls across international borders without their
consent for the purposes of prostitution. The second imposed an obligation on
state parties to punish anyone who recruits into prostitution a woman who has
not reached the age of majority notwithstanding her consent. The League of
Nations adopted two conventions dealing with the traffic in women and children,
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and
Children, Sept. 30, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 416, 116 B.F.S.P. 547, and the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age, Oct. 11,
396
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least a symbolic global consensus that prostitution and trafficking
were human rights violations to be abolished.
A. Historical Background of International Regulation of
Prostitution
The 1949 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in
Persons (1949 Convention),9 the international agreement that
represents the victory of this abolitionist position, states
"prostitution and . . traffic in persons for the purposes of
prostitution are incompatible with the dignity and worth of the
human person."'0 This convention consolidated the view that any
form of prostitution is a human rights violation. Its prohibitions
include enticing, procuring, and leading away another person for the
purposes of prostitution, even with the consent of that person." It
sets aside consent or other expressions of voluntariness as a
defensible measure of the legitimacy of practices of commercial sex.
In the last part of the twentieth century, the United Nations
(U.N.) again ratified abolitionist language. The 1979 Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) 12 uses the abolitionist language of the 1949 Convention,
and calls upon states parties to "take all appropriate measures to
suppress all forms of traffic in women and the exploitation of
prostitution of women."' 3 Ten years later, the 1989 Convention on the
Rights of the Child (Children's Convention) 14 committed state parties
to protect children from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual
1933, 150 L.N.T.S. 431. These instruments prohibited trafficking in women even
if the woman was an adult and had consented to the practice. In 1949, the United
Nations adopted the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and
the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, which combined and superseded
the earlier agreements. G.A. Res. 317(V), Dec. 2, 1949, art. 20 [hereinafter 1949
Convention]. The 1949 Convention is interpreted to treat all forms of prostitution
as a human rights violation and deems all prostitution to be compelled.
9. 1949 Convention, supra note 8, Preamble.
10. Id., art. 1.
11. Id.
12. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, U.N.G.A. Res. 280, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980) (adopted by the U.N.G.A. on Dec.
18, 1979, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) (CEDAW). The United States is a
signatory to CEDAW, but has not ratified this convention.
13. Id., art. 6.
14. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989) (adopted
Nov. 28, 1989, entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) (Children's Convention). The
United States has not ratified this convention.
2006]
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abuse, and prohibited the abduction or sale of, or traffic in, children
for any purpose, including prostitution. 5
Yet after decades in which the abolitionist position prevailed,
arguments for legitimation of adult, voluntary prostitution, as well as
voluntary migration for sex work, are newly alive in international
fora, as well as within some national legal systems. The U.N. has
shown growing acceptance of a distinction between voluntary and
forced prostitution, which obviously implies that some forms of
prostitution and trafficking are acceptable by human rights
standards.
Notwithstanding CEDAW's abolitionist language 16 and the
1949 Convention's position that all prostitution is compelled,' 7 the
Platform for Action' 8 adopted at Beijing in 1995 condemns only forced
prostitution.' 9 Similarly, the Declaration on Violence against
Women approved in 1993 speaks only of "trafficking in women and
forced prostitution."2' The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women2 2 observed in 1994 that "[slome women become
15. Id., art. 34 (providing "States Parties undertake to protect the child
from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. For these purposes, States
Parties shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and
multilateral measures to prevent: (a) The inducement or coercion of a child to
engage in any unlawful sexual activity; (b) The exploitative use of children in
prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; (c) The exploitative use of
children in pornographic performances and materials.") and art. 35 (providing
"States Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral
measures to prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any
purpose or in any form."). See also id., art. 36 (generally prohibiting the
exploitation of children: "States Parties shall protect the child against all other
forms of exploitation prejudicial to any aspects of the child's welfare."). These
views are confirmed, developed, and expanded in more recent instruments that
treat trafficking in women as a form of violence against women. See Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action Art. 2 Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action, June 14-25, 1993, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23, art. 2 (1993 Vienna
Declaration); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 1517
(entered into force July 1, 2003).
16. CEDAW, supra note 12, art. 6.
17. 1949 Convention, supra note 8.
18. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 35 I.L.M. 405 (1995).
19. Id., 91 123, 131d, 224.
20. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res.
104, U.N. GAOR, 48t Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (1993).
21. Id., art. 2(b).
22. United Nations Human Rights Commission, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, It's Causes and Consequences, Ms.
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prostitutes through the exercise of 'rational choice'[,] others become
prostitutes as a result of coercion, deception or economic
enslavement."23 This is a departure from the 1983 report of the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and
the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others,24 which not only
recognized all prostitution as inconsistent with human dignity, but
expressly provided that even when prostitution seems to have been
chosen freely, it is actually the result of coercion.2 5
Most recently, the U.N. Crimes Commission in Vienna
negotiated a new international protocol on trafficking in women,26 a
process accompanied by intense lobbying by feminist
nongovernmental organizations at odds with one another. Consistent
with the view that sex work is legitimate labor, the Network of Sex
Work Projects argued that voluntary, noncoerced participation by
adults in migration for sexual labor is "trafficking" only if it amounts
to the already-recognized human rights violations of forced labor,
slavery, or servitude.27  The abolitionist position, consistently
represented by the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW),
seeks to retain the commitment that all prostitution and migration
for sex work are human rights violations, irrespective of
voluntariness or involuntariness. 28 The resulting Trafficking Protocol
Radhika Coomaraswamy, Submitted in Accordance with Commission on Human
Rights Resolution 1995/85, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/42 (1994).
23. Id., 205.
24. United Nations Human Rights Commission, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of
the Prostitution of Others, U.N. Doc. E/1983/7, (1983).
25. Id., 123.
26. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the U.N. Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, adopted Dec. 15, 2000, U.N. Doc. A/55/383, 40
I.L.M. 335 (entry into force Dec. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Trafficking Protocol].
27. Network of Sex Work Projects, Commentary on the Draft Protocol to
Combat International Trafficking in Women and Children Supplementary to the
Draft Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, A/AC.254/4/add.3 (Jan.
1999), http://wAw.nswp.orglmobility/untoc-comment.html (last visited October
30, 2005); Ann D. Jordan, International Human Rights Law Group, The
Annotated Guide to the Complete U.N. Trafficking Protocol, (May 2002, updated
Aug. 2002), available at http://www.walnet.org/csis/papers/U.N.-TRAFFICKPDF.
28. The Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) proposes instead
that the U.N. Commission on Human Rights "state clearly and unequivocally
that prostitution and trafficking in women for the purposes of prostitution and
sexual exploitation violate the human rights of any women. This, regardless of
whether women were forced by traffickers or driven into prostitution as a result
of prior sexual abuse, poverty, and oppression/inequality[.]" CATW, Written
20061
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continues the trend of distinguishing between voluntary and
involuntary prostitution and migration for sex work.
B. The Current Debate
There is thus a struggle underway within human rights
institutions and discourses about whether to retain the historical
commitment to pursue abolition of prostitution and trafficking or,
alternatively, to change course toward recognition/acceptance of the
possible voluntary nature of these practices and the legitimation of
such voluntary practices. The debate about prostitution invokes
many perspectives, notably libertarian and feminist as well as the
blend of the two.
This article principally addresses the feminist positions both
in support of and in opposition to abolition, acknowledging the
libertarian strain in some feminist stances. We focus on feminist
arguments because these are the animating ideas within the
international human rights debate. Feminist activism around the sex
trade, whether in the domestic or international context, has always
used the prostitute to symbolize broader desires for the inclusion of
women and children in the body politic.
29
1. The Abolitionist Position
The abolitionist position treats all prostitution as a problem
of civil and political human rights, specifically a form of bondage akin
to slavery and/or an institutionalized practice of sexual violence and
gender inequality. In support of this position, abolitionists invoke the
international conventions against trafficking in human beings and
Statement to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 57th Session,
http://action.web.ca/home/catw/readingroom.shtml?x=16042 (last visited October
30, 2005).
29. Jo Doezema makes this point about the anti-prostitution position, with
its emphasis on the suffering of prostitution, and particularly the "Third World
prostitute." Jo Doezema, Ouch! Western Feminists' "Wounded Attachment" to the
"Third World Prostitute," 67 Feminist Rev. 16-38 (Spring 2001) (citing Antoinette
Burton, States of Injury: Josephine Butler on Slavery, Citizenship, and the Boer
War, 1998 Soc. Pol. 338, 339). Doezema thus seeks to ally the modern abolitionist
position with discredited colonialist discourses. Yet the powerful reliance on
rights language by the autonomy position, especially when used by the
nonprostitute academics and advocates who head the relevant organizations, also
symbolically uses the sex worker to speak about rights of women and of workers
in the broadest sense.
400
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against slavery, the conventions for the protection of the rights of
women and children, evolving standards concerning violence against
women, and basic human rights instruments. °
Although there is nothing in the abolitionist position that
necessarily opposes amelioration of working conditions in the sex
trade, abolitionists historically have been wary of any compromise
that might suggest the legitimation of prostitution or trafficking.
Their position is that prostitution must be condemned
uncompromisingly like slavery, and never equated with acceptable
practices like work or with legitimating ideas like consent or
equality. Legally and politically, this translates into a refusal to
distinguish voluntary prostitution and immigration for sex work from
forced prostitution and trafficking, as well as resistance to any
regulatory framework.
Most feminists who advocate international abolition do
support partial decriminalization at the level of national law. This
recognizes the burdens that criminalization places on the prostitute.
Partial decriminalization removes the criminal sanction directed at
the prostitute for sale or solicitation, but leaves in place the
prohibitions directed at patrons/johns, pimps, and other business
interests. But abolitionists do not translate this position into any
accommodation or legitimation of the sex trade. Laurie Shrage
asserts "[a]rguments for decriminalizing prostitution can be made by
appealing to notions of workers' rights and the dignity of low-status
work; they need not appeal to the libertarian ideal of total freedom
from governmental intrusion into the lives of presumably
independent individuals."31  Thus even those who favor
decriminalization may still wish to eradicate commercial sex, and
hope to do so by allowing the weight of legal condemnation to fall on
30. Among the human rights obligations pertinent to the debate as
currently framed are those cited in supra notes 8-28, and also the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, S. Exec. Doc
E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (ratified by the
United States June 8, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1,
993 U.N.T.S. 3, (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCRI; and
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 1, S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-2,
660 U.N.T.S. 195, (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
31. Laurie Shrage, Prostitution and the Case for Decriminalization, 43
Dissent 41, 41 (Spring 1996).
20061
HeinOnline  -- 37 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 401 2005-2006
402 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [37:391
patrons/johns, pimps, and the business structure of the sex industry.
2. The Autonomy Position
The argument opposing abolition, seeking tolerance or
legitimation, is that some prostitution and trafficking, typically
adult, voluntary sex work and migration, is a free choice by an
autonomous individual, and one often made out of economic
necessity. We term this stance the "autonomy" position, which holds
that respect for self-determination requires respect for women's
choices about sex and survival.32 Advocates of this position invoke the
rights to work and to self-determination guaranteed by basic human
rights instruments, as well as internationally-guaranteed labor
rights.3 3 They also argue that sex workers are harmed by limits on
freedom to market their resources and urge that women be allowed
to use their bodies and labor to greatest personal advantage,
especially when women around the globe have few other economic
opportunities and their need is great.34 This economic need argument
grows more compelling in a globalizing economy as modernization,
urbanization, structural reform, and international trading systems
disrupt traditional household and social organizations, diminish
governmental investment in social welfare, and drive down wages. A
globalized economy presses more women into waged work for the
support of themselves and their children, with few other viable
economic opportunities and less household and familial support.3 5
32. On the "sex work as legitimate employment" position, a basic document
is International Committee for Prostitutes' Rights, World Charter for Prostitutes'
Rights (Feb. 1985), reprinted in A Vindication of the Rights of Whores 40 (Gail
Pheterson ed., 1989), available at http://www.walnet.org/csis/groups/icpr-charter.
html (last visited Oct. 30, 2005).
33. See Lin Lean Lim, The Economic and Social Bases of Prostitution in
Southeast Asia, in The Sex Sector: The Economic and Social Bases of Prostitution
in Southeast Asia 1, 14-15 (Lin Lean Lim ed., 1998).
34. See United Nations Development Program, Human Development
Report 1995, 29 (1995), http://www.hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1995/en (last
visited October 30, 2005) ("a widespread pattern of inequality between women
and men persists ... even more in their participation in the economic ...
sphere[]").
35. U.N. Dep't of Economic and Social Affairs, 1999 World Survey on the
Role of Women in Development: Globalization, Gender & Work 128, U.N. Doc.
A/54/227 (1999) (programs "have contributed to the sudden surge of women
seeking paid work. By reducing male employment and levels of family income,
these policies effectively drove women into the labour market in large numbers"
(citation omitted)). Globalization has affected women's participation in the
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The policy position that flows from the autonomy position is
full legalization and legitimation of prostitution as a job like any
other, appropriately subjected to the labor protections offered to all
workers but to no other special rules.36 Jo Bindman and Jo Doezema,
for example, argue that "we first need to identify prostitution as
work, as an occupation susceptible like the others to exploitation.
Then sex workers can be included and protected under the existing
instruments that aim to protect all workers from exploitation, and
women from discrimination."37  Even some antitrafficking
organizations have adopted the distinction between voluntary and
forced prostitution. The Global Alliance Against Trafficking in
Women, for example, demands that international anti-trafficking
instruments distinguish between forced prostitution, which is "[a]
manifestation[] of violence against women ... [and] a violation of the
right to self determination," and voluntary prostitution, which
demands "respect for the self determination of adult persons. 38
The European Court of Human Rights recently ruled in a
case raising the issue of prostitution as work, concluding that sex
work is a protected economic activity.39 However, the Court's ruling
economy, especially noteworthy because of the high proportion of households
headed by female parents and their increasing need to both care for their children
and provide for them.
36. For example, a report recently issued under the imprint of the
International Labour Organization (ILO), a U.N. institution, argues that adult
prostitution can be a freely chosen employment and, as such, should be covered
under the standard labor regulations of a nation and the international labor
standards established by the ILO. See Lim, supra note 33. Citing the expanding
reach of the industry and its unrecognized contribution to the gross domestic
product of four countries in Southeast Asia, Lim urges official recognition of "the
sex sector." Recognition includes extending "labor rights and benefits to sex
workers," improving "working conditions" in the industry, and "extending the
taxation net to cover many of the lucrative activities connected with it." Id. at
212-13. Lim is careful not to speak for the ILO. Although clearly "advocat[ing]
the elimination of child prostitution," she writes, "[the ILO] does not commit itself
to a particular legal position on adult prostitution." Id. at vi.
37. Jo Bindman, with the participation of Jo Doezema, Redefining
Prostitution as Sex Work on the International Agenda (1997)
http://www.walnet.org/csis/papers/redefining.html (last visited October 30, 2005).
38. Jo Doezema, Forced to Choose: Beyond the Voluntary v. Forced
Prostitution Debate, in Global Sex Workers, supra note 2, at 34, 38 (describing
the Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women position).
39. Case C-268/99, Aldona Malgorzata Jany v. Staatssecretaris van
Justitie, 2001 ECR 1-8615 (case brought by Polish and Czech nationals against
the Netherlands Secretary of State for Justice for his refusal of residence permits
to enable them to work as self-employed prostitutes).
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shows that it is seeking to reconcile (or perhaps straddle) the work
versus servitude debate. The Court found that "[tihe activity of
prostitution pursued in a self-employed capacity can be regarded as a
service provided for remuneration."40 The Court stated that
[PIrostitution is an economic activity [when] pursued by a
self-employed person . . ., where it is established that it is
being carried on by the person providing the service:
" outside any relationship of subordination
concerning the choice of that activity, working
conditions and conditions of remuneration;
" under that person's own responsibility; and
" in return for remuneration paid to that person
directly and in full.
4 1
Finally, the Court concluded that "[iut is for the national
court to determine in each case, in the light of the evidence adduced
before it, whether those conditions are satisfied."42
C. Reframing the Debate
Thus mutually exclusive feminist frameworks for
understanding prostitution-one that characterizes it as bondage,
and the other that treats it as work-dominate the current human
rights debate. In earlier work, we explored these dominant
frameworks as played out within feminism's internal debate over
prostitution.4 3 Mary Louise Fellows and Sherene Razack call these
two positions "irreconcilable,' 4 but Jane Larson argued in earlier
work with Linda Hirshman that these seemingly irreconcilable
positions could be negotiated in new ways to create common ground
among feminists for formulating law and policy. 45 Consistent with
our earlier work, together and with others, we argue here that
accepting prostitution as a choice and a means of economic
sustenance does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the policy
40. Id., 4 of ruling (finding based on European Treaty and agreements
between Republic of Poland and Czech Republic).
41. Id., 5 of ruling.
42. Id.
43. See Berta E. Herndndez-Truyol & Jane E. Larson, Both Work and
Violence: Prostitution and Human Rights, in Moral Imperialism: A Critical
Anthology 183 (Berta E. Hernndez-Truyol ed., 2002).
44. Mary Louise Fellows & Sherene Razack, The Race to Innocence:
Confronting Hierarchical Relations Among Women, 1 J. Gender Race & Justice
335, 350 (1998).
45. See Larson & Hirshman, supra note 6, at 286-94.
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response must be legalization and legitimation, either at the national
or international level. To the contrary, if we look to the intersection
of civil/political and economic/social rights as they apply to the issue
of labor, we find moral frameworks and legal tools for resisting forms
of work that endanger or exploit the worker, that recreate
relationships of bondage, or that endanger the interests of women
and workers as political, social, and civil classes. Core labor rights
are human rights, and should be enforced as such.
The development of this argument connects to and
strengthens growing political movements to address the substantive
conditions of labor as a matter of concern for international law and
human rights. Although the mechanisms for enforcement of labor
rights are weaker than those for civil and political rights, a
deepening of the recognition of labor as part of the fabric of
fundamental human rights will strengthen the legal force of labor
rights in every realm. With this article, we hope to make the
problems of prostitution and the related issue of trafficking
important locations for the development of such law. As law develops,
labor rights as human rights will become a stronger tool for
intervention in the range of abusive and exploitative labor practices
driven by and newly visible within the globalizing economy. The
debate over sexual labor is thus a laboratory within which we can
substantively begin to define just conditions of labor.
III. THE RIGHT TO WORK V. HUMAN RIGHTS-A FALSE DICHOTOMY
The human rights system originates in the classical liberal
tradition. Like the philosophy itself, it must continue to "develop,
expand and transform" its justifications to remain consistent with
that core.46 Here we argue that the dominant frameworks of the
current human rights debate over prostitution are falsely polarized,
hindering that process. As discussed above, one side maintains that
the rights to work and to self-determination include the right to sell
sexual access to one's body for a limited period of time, as parallel to
wage labor. The other side equates sex work with slavery, a sale of so
much of one's self that it denies humanness to and strips dignity
from the seller, affronting fundamental goals of the human rights
system. We believe this dichotomization closes off the analysis
46. Berta E. Hernndez-Truyol, Out of the Shadows: Traversing the
Imaginary of Sameness, Difference, and Relationalism-A Human Rights
Proposal, 17 Wisc. Women's L.J. 111, 135 (2002).
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necessary to understand prostitution's complex social reality, each
pole denying some part of the meaning and experience of the
practice. In turn, that simplification means that this complex social
reality cannot engage the theory underlying the human rights
principles invoked, preventing human rights understandings from
deepening and expanding. In this section, we review the major
international agreements conferring human rights, emphasizing the
interrelatedness and interdependence of the human rights system.
A. The Universal Declaration; the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights; and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
As a structure of analysis, the coercion/consent dichotomy is
inconsistent with and, indeed, contrary to established human rights
principles that establish labor rights as human rights. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (the Universal Declaration),47
specifically provides that "[e]veryone has the right to work [and] to
free choice of employment. "48 Further, it provides that "[elveryone
has the right to just and favorable conditions of work,"49 and,
"[elveryone who works has the right to just and favourable
remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence
worthy of human dignity."0 These aspirational sentiments were
rendered binding by the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),5 ' recognizing "the right to work,
which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his
living by work which he freely chooses or accepts."52 The ICESCR
also embraces "the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and
favourable conditions of work,"53 including "safe and healthy working
conditions."54
Economic and social rights conferred by the Universal
Declaration and the ICESCR are referred to as second-generation
rights." These rights reject the exploitation of persons and require
47. Universal Declaration, supra note 30.
48. Id., art. 23(1).
49. Id.
50. Id., art. 23(3).
51. ICESCR, supra note 30. The United States has not ratified this
agreement.
52. Id., art. 6(1).
53. Id., art. 7.
54. Id., art. 7(b).
55. Berta E. Herndndez-Truyol, Human Rights Through a Gendered Lens:
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affirmative state action in order to effectuate them. Economic and
social rights are often juxtaposed to civil and political rights, referred
to as first generation rights.56 The first generation is made up of
negative rights, freeing individuals from governmental interference.
These generally do not require positive state action for their
effectuation. In spite of this distinction, economic and social rights
are indivisible from and interdependent with civil and political
rights, together comprising the fundamental guarantees of essential
rights inherent in human existence.
Some historical contextualization of these agreements is
needed. The U.N. adopted the Universal Declaration,57 the first major
human rights document of the modern era, in 1948. It recognizes "the
inherent dignity and . . . the equal and inalienable rights . . . [of
persons as] the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world."58 The preamble lists freedom of speech and belief and freedom
from fear and want as the "highest aspiration[s]" of persons.5 9 From
the outset, then, the Universal Declaration focused on both civil and
political rights (speech and belief),60 as well as social and economic
rights (freedom from fear and want),6 recognizing a plethora of both
Emergence, Evolution, Revolution, in 1 Women and International Human Rights
Law 3, 25 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig, eds., 1999) (explaining the
different "generations" of human rights).
56. See id. at 25-28.
57. Universal Declaration, supra note 30.
58. Id., Preamble.
59. Id.
60. Id. The civil and political rights enumerated include freedom, equality,
dignity (art. 1); nondiscrimination (art. 2); life, liberty and security of the person
(art. 3); prohibition of slavery (art. 4); prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment (art. 5); recognition as a person (art. 6); equal
protection (art. 7); due process (arts. 8-11); privacy (art. 12); freedom of
movement (art. 13); asylum (art. 14); nationality (art. 15); marriage (art. 16);
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (art. 18); freedom of opinion and
expression (art. 19); freedom of peaceful assembly and association (art. 20); right
to participate in government of country (art. 21). Id. For protections of civil and
political rights, see ICCPR, supra note 30, and discussion thereof, infra notes 66-
97 and accompanying text.
61. Universal Declaration, supra note 30. The economic rights include the
right to own property and not be arbitrarily deprived thereof (art. 17); social
security and realization "of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable
for his dignity and the free development of his personality" (art. 22); work,
including "just and favorable work conditions, protection against unemployment,
equal pay for equal work, just pay ensuring to the worker and his/her family an
existence worthy of human dignity, and form and join trade unions" (art. 23); rest
and leisure including "reasonable limitation of working hours" (art. 24),
2006]
HeinOnline  -- 37 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 407 2005-2006
408 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [37:391
categories of rights. The Universal Declaration was originally
intended to be the blueprint for a single, legally binding human
rights treaty embracing civil and political, as well as economic and
social, rights. Ideological divisions between the developing and
developed nations, however, resulted in the bifurcation of the
Universal Declaration's contemplated unitary approach.62 Thus, the
U.N. in 1951 adopted two separate covenants that became the
normative bedrock of the human rights regime: the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)63  and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR).6 These documents made the Universal Declaration's
international norms into binding obligations for signatory nations.6 5
Why two separate treaties? One explanation is that the two
sets of rights are of a different nature. Civil and political rights are
absolute, enforceable, and immediately applicable; 66 economic, social,
and cultural rights are hortatory and can only be progressively
realized.67 The ICESCR itself reflects this gradualist approach,
stating that the rights provided may be limited, but "only in so far as
this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for
"standard of living adequate for health and well-being" of the worker and his/her
family "including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services" (art. 25); education (art. 26); participation in cultural life (art. 27). Id.
For protections of economic, social, and cultural rights, see also ICESCR, supra
note 30, and discussion thereof, infra notes 66-97 and accompanying text.
62. Herncrndez-Truyol, Human Rights Through a Gendered Lens, supra
note 55; see also Asbjorn Eide, Economic, Cultural and Social Rights as Human
Rights, in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook 9 (Asbjorn Eide et
al., eds., 2001) (stating that the Universal Declaration, adopted in 1948,
contained a whole range of human rights within one consolidated text. This was
subsequently divided into two main categories, in 1951, during the drafting of the
International Bill of Human Rights. The General Assembly decided that two
separate human rights covenants should be prepared. One of the covenants would
focus on civil and political rights; the other would focus on economic, social and
cultural rights.).
63. ICCPR, supra note 30.
64. ICESCR, supra note 30.
65. See Henri J. Steiner & Philip Alston, International Human Rights in
Context: Law, Politics, Morals 244 (2000).
66. See id. at 245 (quoting Annotations on the Text of the Draft
International Covenants on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (1955), at 7).
67. See id. ("economic, social and cultural rights were not or might not be
[enforceable, justiciable, or of an 'absolute' character]"); Eide, supra note 62, at 10
(quoting E.W. Vierdag, The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 Netherlands
Yearbook of International Law 69, 103 (1978)).
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the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic
society."6' There is no parallel acceptance of gradualism in the
ICCPR.
Another explanation is that civil and political rights are
justiciable and thus easily applied by national courts.69 Economic,
social, and cultural rights, on the other hand, are of a more political
than legal nature,70 and are therefore not immediately applicable by
judges nor easily invoked in courts of law. 7' They require state
support of programs involving the efforts of various branches of
government, including those that control the budget.
The international community has challenged the coherence of
the "justiciability" and "immediate applicability" arguments as bases
for distinguishing economic and social rights from civil and political
rights. The Limburg Principles,7 2 adopted in 1986 by a meeting of
authoritative experts on international law, state that although a full
realization of the rights in the ICESCR is to be progressively
attained, "the application of some rights can be made justiciable
immediately while other rights can become justiciable over time.
More specifically, the Limburg Principles observe that "[s]ome
obligations under the ICESCR require immediate implementation in
full by all States parties, such as the prohibition of discrimination in
Article 2(2) of the Covenant."74
Another, more pragmatic explanation for the adoption of two
separate documents is the price tag of implementation for signatory
nations.75 It does not cost a government much to implement
individual rights to be free from state intervention. Civil and political
68. ICESCR, supra note 30, art. 4.
69. See Eide, supra note 62, at 10.
70. See id.
71. See Martin Scheinin, Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights, in
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 62, at 29.
72. Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17,
Maastricht, June 2-6, 1986 (hereinafter Limburg Principles].
73. Id., Principle No. 8.
74. Id., Principle No. 22.
75. See Steiner & Alston, supra note 65, at 245; see also Philip Harvey,
Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking Economic and Social
Rights Seriously, 33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 363, 379 (2002) (stating that under
the ICCPR, states parties incur the obligation to immediately secure most of the
rights enumerated in the agreement, whereas states parties to the ICESCR
generally commit themselves only to working toward the realization of the rights
enumerated in the agreement).
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rights are such rights. By contrast, rights that require the state to
take positive action and that create obligations to provide welfare to
the individual cost much more.76 Social and economic rights are of the
latter variety.
Yet the negative/positive distinction is less than consistent.
For example, beyond the substantive rights to vote, of free
association, and other individual freedoms, the ICCPR includes
process rights of fair trial and representation.7 7  For the
implementation of such rights, there must be legislatures, police,
courts, and attorneys. Due process requires both state resources and
positive state action for realization. The obligation to create the
structures and processes necessary to implement process rights does
not substantially differ from the state's obligations under the
ICESCR concerning health,78 education,7 9 social security, ° fair
working conditions,1 or an adequate standard of living. 2
The fact that economic and social rights can be achieved
progressively does not "alter the nature of the legal obligation of
States . . . to demonstrate that [they are] making measurable
progress toward the full realization of the rights in question."8 3
76. See Eide, supra note 62, at 10. The Limburg Principles recognize these
costs as they acknowledge that the ICESCR requires state parties to ensure
respect for minimum subsistence rights for all regardless of the state's level of
economic development. See Limburg Principles, supra note 72, Principle No. 25.
77. See e.g., ICCPR, supra note 30, arts. 9 (freedom from arbitrary arrest,
right to prompt trial, right to trial), 14 (right to fair and public hearing,
presumption of innocence, right to counsel, right to appeal), and 15 (protection
from retroactive criminal laws).
78. ICESCR, supra note 30, art. 12.
79. Id., art. 13.
80. Id., art. 9.
81. Id., art. 7.
82. Id., art. 11.
83. See Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Maastricht, Jan. 22-26, 1997, Principle No. 8 [hereinafter
Maastricht Guidelines]. A group of more than thirty experts convened in
Maastricht in January 1997 to discuss the ICESCR. They noted that the
Covenant states that all human rights are equal, and that civil and political
rights, as well as economic, social, and cultural rights are indivisible,
interrelated, and interdependent. See id., Principle No. 4 ("It is now undisputed
that all human rights are indivisible, interdependent, interrelated and of equal
importance for human dignity."). All states, therefore, are "responsible for
violations of economic, social and cultural rights as they are for violations of civil
and political rights." Id. As both treaties are subject to international law, states
must comply with their treaty obligations under the ICESCR, just as they must
with the ICCPR. Thus a violation of the ICESCR constitutes a violation of
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States should not use the excuse that Article 2 of the ICESCR allows
states to use progressive means to fully achieve economic and social
rights either as a pretext for noncompliance or as a rationale to claim
lack of obligation.84
At bottom, the supposed differences in the nature of the two
sets of rights can be overstated. Both covenants state that the two
international law. See id., Principle No. 5 ("As in the case of civil and political
rights, the failure by a State Party to comply with a treaty obligation concerning
economic, social and cultural rights is, under international law, a violation of that
treaty.").
Moreover, contrary to the suggestion that the ICESCR's provisions are only
hortatory, the Maastricht Guidelines urge that the ICESCR imposes three
different types of obligations on states: (1) to respect the existing resources and
not prevent individuals from access to those resources; (2) to provide measures to
ensure that enterprises and individuals do not deprive other individuals of their
access to rights and resources; and (3) to fulfill (facilitate) pro-active means that
would strengthen people's access to, and the utilization of, available resources
and the means to ensure their livelihood. See U.N. Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12 (1999), E/C.12/1999/5, May
12, 1999 (discussing that the right to adequate food, like any other human right,
imposes three types or levels of obligations on State parties: the obligations to
respect, to protect and to fulfill. In turn, the obligation to fulfill incorporates both
an obligation to facilitate and an obligation to provide.). See also Maastricht
Guidelines, supra, Principle No. 6 (stating that the "obligation to respect requires
States to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of economic, social and
cultural rights. Thus, the right to housing is violated if the States engage in
arbitrary forced evictions .... [Tihe failure to ensure that private employers
comply with basic labour standards may amount to a violation of the right to
work or the right to just and favorable conditions of work. The obligation to fulfill
requires States to take appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary,
judicial and other measures towards the full realization of such rights. Thus, the
failure of States to provide essential primary health care to those in need may
amount to a violation.").
See also ICESCR, supra note 30, art. 16 ("State Parties . .. undertake to submit
... reports on the measures which they have adopted and the progress made in
achieving the observance of the rights recognized herein.").
84. See Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 83, Principle No. 8 ("The State
cannot use the 'progressive realization' provisions in article 2 of the Covenant as
a pretext for noncompliance. Nor can the State justify derogations or limitations
of rights recognized in the Covenant because of different social, religious and
cultural backgrounds.").
85. Both the ICCPR and the ICESCR have key provisions that are almost
identical. The preambles for both treaties espouse the obligation of states under
the U.N. Charter to promote human rights. ICCPR, supra note 30, Preamble;
ICESCR, supra note 30, Preamble. Both treaties recognize the need for all
individuals to strive for the promotion and observance of rights that "derive from
the inherent dignity of the human person." ICCPR, supra note 30, Preamble;
ICESCR, supra note 30, Preamble. Further, Article 1 of each instrument states
2006]
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sets of rights are interrelated. The preambles to both the ICCPR and
the ICESCR recognize that "freedom from fear and want can only be
achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his
civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural
rights."86  This articulation expressly acknowledges the
interdependence and indivisibility of both sets of rights to the
attainment of human dignity.
The interdependence and indivisibility of the two Covenants
reflect the fact that "the two sets of rights can neither logically nor
practically be separated in watertight compartments."7 The ICCPR,
that "[aill peoples have the right to self-determination." ICCPR, supra note 30,
art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 30, art. 1. And accordingly, states must freely allow
their citizens to determine their social status and freely pursue their economic,
social, and cultural development. Similarly, Article 2 of both treaties sets out
principles of nondiscrimination. ICCPR, supra note 30, art. 2; ICESCR, supra
note 30, art. 2. Art. 3 of both conventions reaffirms the equal right of men and
women to enjoy all human rights. The ICESCR states that "State Parties ...
undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all
economic, social and cultural rights." ICESCR, supra note 30, art 3. The ICCPR
states that "State Parties ... undertake to ensure the equal right of men and
women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights." ICCPR, supra note 30,
art. 3.
86. ICCPR, supra note 30, Preamble. In the ICESCR, the last phrase reads
"whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as
his civil and political rights." ICESCR, supra note 30, Preamble.
87. Steiner & Alston, supra note 65, at 247. Recent court decisions affirm
that economic rights are crucial to the fulfillment of the personhood that is the
foundational concern of the human rights structure. In a case involving the right
to work, although decided under the Indian Constitution, the Supreme Court of
India directly linked first and second generation rights. The Court expressly held
that:
[tihe sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 [of the
Indian Constitution] is wide and far reaching. It does not mean
merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away ....
That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important
facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person
can live without the means of living, that is, the means of
livelihood....
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp., AIR 1986 Supreme Ct. 18, (Supreme Ct.
of India, 1985), available at http://www.elaw.org/resources/text.asp?id=1104 (last
visited May 9, 2005) (pavement and slum dwellers' protection from eviction from
their shelters without alternative accommodation).
In October 2000, the Constitutional Court of South Africa similarly found that
civil rights are inexorably intertwined with social and economic rights.
Specifically, it ruled that:
[t]he right of access to adequate housing is entrenched because
we value human beings and want to ensure that they are
412
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for example, contains some provisions that constitute the condition
for, and thus are implicit in, economic and social rights.8" Although
the right to form trade unions is contained in Art. 8 of the ICESCR,8 9
the right to freedom of association (so foundational to labor
organizing), is recognized in Art. 22 of the ICCPR. 90 Similarly, the
prohibition against discrimination can be derived from Art. 2 of the
ICESCR, 9' as well as from Arts. 2 and 26 of the ICCPR.92
The most likely interpretation of the bifurcation is that
opposition by developed industrial states to granting economic and
social rights resulted in the adoption of two separate treaties.9 3 As a
result of the bifurcation, states had the opportunity to refuse to
undertake obligations under the ICESCR, and instead opt to ratify
afforded their basic human needs. A society must seek to
ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided to all if it
is to be a society based on human dignity, freedom and
equality.
Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169,
T 44 (CC), available at http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/children/cases/
grootbooml.pdf (last visited December 9, 2005) (constitutional protection for the
homeless from eviction while waiting in informal homes situated on private land
earmarked for formal low-cost housing without consent of the owner).)
In another instance, the Constitutional Court of South Africa recognized that
state resources play a role in the state's obligation regarding social and economic
rights-in this case, the right to health when it regretfully dismissed an appeal
for provision of renal dialysis treatment, finding that "the obligations imposed on
the state by [the Constitution] are dependent upon the resources available for
such purposes, and that the corresponding rights themselves are limited by
reason of the lack of resources." The Court concluded, "[tihe state has to manage
its limited resources in order to address all [its citizens'] claims [for access to
housing, food and water, employment opportunities, and social security]. There
will be times when this requires it to adopt a holistic approach to the larger needs
of society rather than to focus on the specific needs of particular individuals
within society." Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, 1998 (1) SA 765, 31 (CC),
available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/1617.PDF (state
provision of nonemergent, renal dialysis health care treatment to indigent
patient).
88. See, e.g., supra notes 77-82 and infra notes 89-92.
89. ICESCR, supra note 30, art. 8.
90. ICCPR, supra note 30, art. 22. For a nonlabor rights example, compare
Article 13 of the ICESCR, supra note 30, art. 13, addressing the right to an
education and the parental liberty to choose a child's school, with Art. 18 of the
ICCPR, supra note 30, art. 18, addressing the liberty of parents to choose their
child's religious and moral education.
91. ICESCR, supra note 30, art. 2.
92. ICCPR, supra note 30, arts. 2, 26.
93. Herndndez-Truyol, supra note 55.
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only the ICCPR. Significantly, however, of the 152 states that have
ratified the ICCPR, only five states-Botswana, Haiti, Mozambique,
South Africa, and the United States-have failed also to ratify the
ICESCR.
More recently, the World Conference on Human Rights, in
July 1993, adopted the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
(Vienna Declaration). 94 The preamble of the Vienna Declaration,
which representatives of 171 States adopted by consensus, affirms
that "all human rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent in
the human person, and... the human person is the central subject of
human rights and fundamental freedoms." 5 The Vienna Declaration
itself states that all human rights are universal, indivisible,
interdependent, and interrelated, and calls on the international
community to treat all human rights in a fair and equal manner, on
the same footing, and with the same emphasis.9 6 Therefore, every
state should promote and protect all human rights and fundamental
freedoms, regardless of whether the rights are civil, political,
economic, social, or cultural.
As we have seen, states enjoy a margin of discretion in
selecting the means for implementing their obligations under both
the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Most states tend to enforce the ICCPR
with greater fidelity than the ICESCR, which sometimes is simply
ignored. As a result, economic and social conditions have declined at
an alarming rate for over 1.6 billion people worldwide. 97 The
following discussion of labor rights specifically reveals the
interconnection between civil and political rights and social and
94. 1993 Vienna Declaration, supra note 15.
95. Id., Preamble, 2.
96. Id., Part I, 5.
97. See Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 83, Principle No. 1. The
document further states in Principle No. 1 that the impact of the disparities
among rich and poor countries on the lives of people is dramatic, and "renders the
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights illusory for a significant portion
of humanity." Id. See also U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, United Nations High Comm'r for Human Rights Fact Sheet No. 16 (Rev.
1), http://shr.aaas.org/thesaurus/instrument.php?insid= 79 (last visited Oct. 30,
2005) (discusses the need to recognize economic, social, and cultural rights as
indivisible and interdependent of civil and political rights. It further notes that
more than 1.5 billion people lack clean drinking water and sanitation, and some
500 million children do not have access to primary education. More than one
billion children cannot read and write. The ICESCR provides the most important
international legal framework for protecting these rights to health, education,
and food.). See ICESCR, supra note 30, arts. 12, 13, 11, respectively.
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economic rights.
B. The International Labour Organization
The primary international organization for human rights as
they pertain to work is the International Labour Organization (ILO).
The ILO's predecessor, the International Labour Office, was
established in the post-World War I drive to protect individual rights
in the world sphere. The Treaty of Versailles98 established the
organization in 1919 "to abolish the 'injustice, hardship and
privation' which workers suffered and to guarantee 'fair and humane
conditions of labour."'99 The ILO established numerous programs to
promote the well-being of workers and safety in the workplace. These
initiatives included a series of treaties that set labor standards for
minimum working conditions,100 including minimum age,'0 ' hours of
work,'0 2 and similar matters, as well as agreements protecting the
rights to association and to organize' 3 and dealing with forced
labor. 04
98. The Peace Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919 (peace settlement signed
between Germany and the Allies after World War I had ended in 1918 and in the
shadow of the Russian Revolution and other events in Russia) [hereinafter Treaty
of Versailles].
99. Virginia Leary, Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour
Organisation, in The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal
580, 582 (Philip Alston ed., 1992); see also Treaty of Versailles, supra note 98,
Part XIII, art. 393 (setting out guidelines for the governance and operation of the
ILO).
100. For a comprehensive list of labor subject matters covered by ILO
conventions, see http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/subjectE.htm (last visited Oct.
30, 2005).
101. ILO Minimum Age Convention, No. 138, concerning the Minimum
Age for Admission to Employment, art. 2(3), 1015 U.N.T.S. 297 (adopted June 26,
1973, entered into force June 19, 1976).
102. The up-to-date ILO instruments on hours of work, weekly rest, and
paid leave are the following: Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention, 1921 (No. 14);
Weekly Rest (Commerce and Offices) Convention (No. 106) and Recommendation
(No. 103), 1957; Part-Time Work Convention (No. 175) and Recommendation (No.
182), 1994; Reduction of Hours of Work Recommendation, 1962 (No. 116). The
following are Instruments with interim status: Forty-Hour Week Convention,
1935 (No. 47); Holidays with Pay Convention (Revised), 1970 (No. 132); and
Holidays with Pay Recommendation, 1954 (No. 98).
103. The following are the ILO instruments on the right to association and
the right to organize: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); and Right to Organise and Collective
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).
104. The up-to-date ILO instruments that comprise the Fundamental
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In recent years, the ILO has moved to link labor rights
explicitly to the broader human rights structure. The ILO's 1998
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work'
0 5
identifies four "core" human rights related to labor: (1) the freedom of
association, (2) the prohibition of forced or compulsory labor, (3) the
elimination of exploitative forms of child labor, and (4) the
elimination of discrimination. 10 6 Each of these core rights pertains to
the work of commercial sex as we analyze it below.
The ILO does not compel or enforce its conventions on either
nation states or employers; ILO conventions bind only signatories
that have ratified the 'treaties. The organization lacks the vertical
authority to enforce sanctions. Instead, the ILO relies upon the
power of horizontal monitoring, publicity, and behind-the-scenes
pressure to induce voluntary compliance. 10 7 The ILO provides
standards for review and promotes cooperation between labor rights
groups, employers, and governments.
08
Despite the lack of enforcement power, the ILO has affected
governments that rely upon ILO conventions when adopting,
modifying, or interpreting their own national labor legislation. For
example, even though the United States has not ratified certain key
ILO conventions, the U.S. Department of State Office of
International Labor Affairs echoes the ILO's goals, stating:
The Office of International Labor Affairs promotes the
rights of workers throughout the world. The Office seeks to
Conventions on Forced Labour (and Related Recommendations) are the following:
Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor, ILO Conv. No. 29, 39
U.N.T.S. 55, art. 2 (adopted on June 28, 1930, entered into force May 1, 1932)
[hereinafter Forced Labour Convention]; Forced Labour (Indirect Compulsion)
Recommendation, 1930 (No. 35); Convention Concerning Abolition of Forced
Labour, ILO Conv. No. 105, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (entered into force Jan. 17, 1959)
[hereinafter Abolition of Forced Labour Convention].
105. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,
Document CIT/1998/PR20A (June 1998) [hereinafter ILO Declaration],
http://www.logos-net.net/ilo/150_base/en/instr/decla.htm (last visited Oct. 30,
2005) [hereinafter ILO Declaration].
106. Id., art. 2.
107. For a description of the ILO's compliance powers, see Virginia A.
Leary, The Paradox of Workers' Rights as Human Rights, in Human Rights,
Labor Rights, and International Trade 22, 41-42 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F.
Diamond eds., 1996).
108. The governing body is the executive body of the ILO and is composed
of members who are governments, employers, and workers. See
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/index.htm (last visited Oct.
30, 2005).
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ensure that all workers can exercise their rights in the
workplace and thus share in the prosperity of the global
economy .... Such economic progress, coupled with respect
for the fundamental rights of workers, will strengthen
democratic development, foster the growth of consumer
markets, and provide a more stable environment for civil
society and the promotion of human rights.1
0 9
The office's goals include "seek[ing] to ensure that all workers
can exercise their rights in the workplace . . . [and p]romot[ing]
universal recognition and implementation of internationally
recognized core labor standards,"lO and specifically lists the four core
principles contained in the ILO's Declaration of Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work."'
Through this articulation of core rights, the ILO has defined
free and just labor conditions by negation. In other words, although
the ILO does not clearly specify what free labor is, it does directly
state what it is not. These negative boundaries fence out certain
relationships and labor practices as impermissible. Other ILO
instruments establish affirmative rights related to work, but within
broad parameters that allow many interpretations. Like the
Universal Declaration"1 2 and the ICESCR,"3 the ILO affirms that
everyone has the right to work, is entitled "to just and favorable
conditions of work," and is entitled to fair wages for his/her work that
enable the worker and his/her family to live with dignity." 
4
The right to work as well as the substantive conditions of
work are basic human rights. The dichotomy that juxtaposes work to
human rights in the debate over prostitution misunderstands,
109. Office of International Labor Affairs, Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep't of State, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/lbr (last visited
Oct. 30, 2005).
110. Id.
111. Id. (construing ILO Declaration, supra note 105, art. 2) (specifically,
"(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to organize
and bargain collectively; (b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory
labor; (c) the effective abolition of child labour; and (d) the elimination of
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation").
112. Universal Declaration, supra note 30, art. 23(3).
113. ICESCR, supra note 30, arts. 6, 7.
114. See ILO, The ILO: What It Is. What It Does (2004), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/download/brochure/pdf/broch-0904.p
df; supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text; see also Universal Declaration,
supra note 30, art. 23 (expressing employment rights such as equal opportunity
and unionization).
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misrepresents, and thus violates fundamental principles of the very
international norms that advocates of each position invoke.
IV. How is WORK DISTINCT FROM BONDAGE?-DECONSTRUCTING
THE VOLUNTARINESS/CONSENT IDEA
The idea of intolerable labor is not new to the human rights
system, as we discuss above." 5 The commitment to abolish some
labor relations derives from the classical liberal political theory that
drove the creation of modern western states, as well as the human
rights system. Part A below explores the historical distinctions
between work and bondage; Part B deconstructs the
voluntariness/consent idea.
A. Of Work or Bondage?
Consistent with the core liberal belief that human dignity
requires autonomy, the premise of labor rights is that consent or
voluntariness alone cannot guarantee freedom from bondage. For
example, classical liberal political thinkers consistently rejected the
idea that one could sell oneself into slavery.'6 One may not alienate
the entirety of one's own body and personality through enslavement,
even if the enslaved consents freely to the subjection.
Yet from the outset, liberal theory contained an internal
ambiguity on this crucial question of the voluntary alienation of the
self. Locke, most notably, asserted that although one could not
consent to slavery, each man owned his own labor and the fruits
thereof: "[E]very Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body
has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work
115. See supra at text accompanying notes 47-56.
116. See, e.g., John Locke, Two Treatises of Government II, ch.7, § 135
(Peter Laslett, ed. 1988) ("no Body has an absolute Arbitrary Power over himself,
or over any other.... ."). Hegel perhaps best explains this powerful exception to
the defining liberal commitment to individual autonomy. Because the moral
personality requires a physical embodiment in this world, the body comes to
stand for the self. Hegel writes: "Therefore, these goods, or rather substantive
characteristics, which constitute my own private personality, and the universal
essence of my self-consciousness are inalienable and my right to them is
imprescriptible." Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of Right 52-53 (T.
M. Knox, trans., Clarendon Press, 1949) (1821). The important exception to this
consensus is Hobbes. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 138-39 (Richard Tuck ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996) (1651).
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of his Hands, we may say, are properly his."' 17 The individual
possesses himself, and his freedom is exercised through his ability to
dispose of himself as he chooses.
This property in labor is essential if wage labor contracts are
to be possible; the worker must own what he offers for sale. In the
liberal regime, property is not only the right to use and enjoy; it is
crucially the right to alienate."18 Yet this alienability of property in
labor leads to the commodification of labor: a man's labor can be sold
even if his person cannot. Owning his own labor, the worker brings it
to market as a good to be exchanged for a wage.
If a single criterion of the possessive market society is
wanted it is that man's labour is a commodity, i.e. that a
man's energy and skill are his own, yet are regarded not as
integral parts of his personality, but as possessions, the use
and disposal of which he is free to hand over to others for a
price.
As a commodity, labor is sold in markets that, absent
political intervention, do not differentiate between human and
nonhuman goods. The boundary between bondage and free labor thus
depends importantly upon the possibility of separating "services" or
"labour power" from the person such that the sale of labor is not a
sale of the person.
20
Liberalism makes three conventional distinctions to delineate
the sale of labor from the sale of the person. 12' First, work is not
slavery because the worker consents to the arrangement that
includes the right to leave and work for another. Second, work is a
reciprocal relationship requiring an exchange of value, embodied in
the wage bargain. Finally, there is a temporal limit on the sale of
labor; labor in waged employment is not perpetual, as it is for the
slave. Locke summarizes:
117. Locke, supra note 116, at II, ch.5, § 27. Locke's use of the term "man"
does not stand in for "human." He made clear that women and children were not
owners of their own bodies and labors, or of the fruits thereof. Rather, they were
in a relationship of natural rather than political or contractual submission to
their superiors. See id. at I, ch.5, § 47; II, ch.5, § 82. See generally Carol Pateman,
The Sexual Contract 25-41, 25 (1988) (discussing the historical view of the
patriarchal family as the "original and natural social form" from which civil or
political society develops).
118. C. B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism
215 (1962).
119. Id. at 48.
120. See Pateman, supra note 117, at 72.
121. For a critical review of the literature, see id. at 39-76.
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[A free man becomes a worker by] selling ... for a certain
time, the Service he undertakes to do, in exchange for
wages he is to receive: . . . The Master [has] but a
Temporary Power over him, and no greater, than what is
contracted in the Contract between 'em.
122
By each of these three measures, the worker as owner of
himself is distinguished from the slave as the property of another.
Critics have questioned whether these distinctions
sufficiently mitigate the negation of self-ownership inherent in the
sale of labor. From this critical position arose the argument of "wage
slavery." Labor radicals in nineteenth-century America made these
arguments in the struggle to define free labor in opposition to chattel
slavery.123 First, they argued, labor is not an alienable commodity
that can be separated from its original owner in the ways that the
fruits of labor can be. What the wage laborer sells is control over the
body, energy, will, and time. When the right to command one's body
and time is transferred to another, so too is the person to whom these
attributes are attached, which veers disturbingly close to slavery.
Second, even if any one wage bargain is limited by time, given
unequal resources, the worker must continuously repeat the
transaction throughout life. Thus, even though the free laborer may
not sell himself for the entirety of his life, by selling himself over and
over, the wage laborer confronts a bondage as permanent as chattel
status. Finally, where wages fall below the level required for a
dignified life or even of survival, the exchange of value is so
unbalanced as to negate reciprocity. 124 Even owners of slaves, after
all, tried to keep their laborers alive enough to work and reproduce.
Although the claim of "wage slavery" was never literally
accepted, these critiques developed to challenge deeply the
concurrently emerging ideological principle of free contract, also
closely tied to liberalism. 25 The response was significant government
122. Locke, supra note 116, at II, ch. 5, § 85.
123. See generally Stanley, supra note 5 (examining different ways, all
rooted in the principles of contract, in which individuals can be considered
"slaves" to other individuals or to institutions).
124. See id. at 138.
125. Lea VanderVelde, for example, documents the extent to which the
legislative debates surrounding the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment
abolishing slavery in the United States did much more than repudiate the
particular antebellum southern institution that subjugated black persons as
laboring slaves. These debates defined bondage against the backdrop of an
extensive and impassioned exploration of what constitutes fair and just labor
relations. Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment,
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intervention in the labor market. By the twentieth century, law in
the United States and other countries had made the employment
contract unlike any other contract for the sale of goods. This was
further enshrined as the idea of labor rights migrated from the
national to the international setting. 126 Despite recent erosions at the
national level and a continuing weakness of enforcement at the
international level, the substance of the labor relation as defined by
wages, hours, and conditions remains subject to baseline rules below
which no worker, no matter how disempowered, should fall. The law
provides additional protections to those with the least amount of
bargaining power, including children and workers subject to
exclusion or abuse based on social status. And although neither
equivalence of exchange in the wage bargain nor parity of bargaining
power is required, national labor laws and international labor rights
encourage workers to aggregate their bargaining power through
collective action.2 7 But even if they bargain collectively, workers
cannot consent to working conditions deemed too exploitative to be
compatible with human freedom. This is the goal of all nations that
enact labor regimes and of the international labor rights system.
Each of these checks on contract freedom reflects the conviction that
the labor exchange is more than just another sale, and also an
implicit recognition that consent or contract alone cannot prevent
bondage in labor.
Not coincidentally, we would argue, during the historical
period when the liberal states were struggling to define "free labor"
as something more than "free contract," prostitution became an
important issue in both the national and international arenas. The
United States and Britain, those western nations most implicated in
138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 437, 437 (1989). By this reading, the amendment embodied "a
principle of universal free labor, not just one of racial equality." Id. at 471. See
also id. at 438-39 ("Many members of Congress envisioned the amendment as a
charter for labor freedom, and they defined that ideal in extensive debates. For
these members, free labor was not just the absence of slavery and its vestiges; it
was the guarantee of an affirmative state of labor autonomy.").
126. Significantly, the ICESCR contemplates fair wages (art. 7), as well as
an adequate standard of living including food, clothing, and housing (art. 11),
both of which premises would support labor's argument of non-reciprocity if these
standards are not met. ICESCR, supra note 30.
127. See Nat'l Labor Rel. Act, 29 U.S.C. Ch.7.II (explicitly granting
employees the right to collectively bargain and form trade unions); Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (providing child labor requirements). The
International Labour Organization also protects freedom of association for
workers. ILO Declaration, supra note 105.
2006]
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chattel slavery, found the issue uniquely problematic. Where other
western nations experimented with regulated prostitution, the
United States and Britain confronted strong domestic opposition to
such proposals from feminists and other social reformers. In 1875,
after defeating regulated prostitution at home in Britain, Josephine
Butler helped form the British, Continental, and General Federation
for the Abolition of State Regulated Prostitution. 128 This organization
marked the beginning of an international anti-prostitution
movement. 129
In the United States, the leading activists of the emerging
international movement to abolish prostitution came from
antislavery abolitionism.' 30 They used the term "white slave" to
communicate their belief that prostitution was a new form of slavery.
Consistent with these views, the governments of the United States
and Britain criminalized prostitution. Prostitution came to be defined
as a relation outside the realm of legitimate contract, a sale of
services categorically marked off from the wage labor bargain. As
Amy Dru Stanley puts it, in the division between freedom and
bondage, if wage labor stood for emancipation, sexual labor came to
stand for the descent into new forms of slavery.' It is this history
that underlies the adoption of the abolitionist position in the initial
international agreements concerning prostitution and trafficking in
128. See generally Pivar, supra note 7 (discussing the transformation of
anti-prostitution efforts from a social dignity movement to a clinical effort to stop
the spread of disease).
129. Scholars are just beginning to trace the ancestry of the international
human rights process, especially the role and strategies of nongovernmental
organizations in early transnational reform movements. See Margaret E. Keck &
Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International
Politics 43-44 (1998) The political strategy of pressuring the nation states by
mobilizing international moral condemnation was pioneered by several early
international women's campaigns, including those for women's suffrage, against
foot-binding, and against female genital excision. On the anti-prostitution front,
international activism resulted in, among other legal reforms, domestic laws in
the United States to combat prostitution and trafficking such as the Mann Act,
36 Stat. 825, 1911, 18 U.S.C. Ch. 395 (An Act to Further Regulate Interstate and
Foreign Commerce by Prohibiting the Transportation Therein for Immoral
Purposes of Women and Girls, and for Other Purposes, June 25, 1910), as well as
international agreements to which the nation is a signatory that treat
prostitution as a prohibited trade in human beings subject to abolition. See supra
note 7.
130. See Pivar, supra note 7, at 255 (arguing that both the abolition and
anti-prostitution movements were a part of a larger "purity reform" movement).
131. Stanley, supra note 5, at 240-42, 263.
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the early twentieth century. 132
The reappearance of the issue of prostitution on the
international stage in our own time is usually attributed to the
concurrent rise of the women's movement and the expansion of the
human rights system. As a matter of politics and culture, this
explanation is obviously correct. But at a meta-level, our renewed
attention to prostitution also coincides with a crisis of moral
legitimacy of the market system, captured by this complex
phenomenon we call "globalization." As was true in the postbellum
period's struggle to differentiate free labor from chattel slavery,
today's debate over whether prostitution is free or unfree labor goes
to the very heart of the legitimacy of the market. Interestingly, it is
again those nations with slave and abolitionist pasts that are caught
up in the current debate over prostitution's legitimacy. This suggests
a resurgence of the historical skepticism about the ideology of
contract as freedom, as well as the reemergence of the prostitute as
the symbol of that uneasiness.
The popular understanding of globalization emphasizes its
economic impact, literally translating globalization as the worldwide
ascendancy and intensification of capitalism. Yet globalization also
has political, moral, social, and cultural dimensions. It is unclear
whether civic, political, and emotional relationships provide
sufficient balance to the norms of market relations. Specifically, sex
has never been the haven of intimacy and altruism that could fight
off market norms, but its mythology makes it a useful symbol for
relationships that exist outside the market. So, once again, sex in the
market (and, in this new global context, trafficking of sexual labor)
stands as a defining issue for these broader cultural fears.
To the extent that global market norms accept sex work as
just another form of wage labor, it justifies the dominance of
capitalist relations under globalization. To the extent that
prostitution remains problematic in the global expansion of the labor
market, the moral legitimacy of transfer of human goods, including
service, continues to be debatable. If debatable, then feminists, like
abolitionists and labor radicals of an earlier era, must find
arguments other than consent to distinguish free from unfree social
relations. As Don Herzog puts it, "consent theory is inevitably
entangled in substantive concerns, not purely procedural ones about
132. Id.
4232006]
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when choice is voluntary, when not."3 3 The presence of consent or
voluntariness alone is not enough to fend off the dispossession,
exploitation, and alienation of human bondage: "Mere exemption
from servitude is a miserable idea of freedom." 134
B. Deconstructing the Voluntariness/Consent Idea
The most persuasive arguments in support of the view that
selling sexual service can be a form of work rest on the paired
observations that women mostly take up this work out of economic
need, and that it is voluntary, at least to the extent that the effort to
make a livelihood is any kind of "choice" for poor women anywhere.
At this level of description, the claim of voluntary work is hard to
dispute. In the debate over prostitution policy, however, the
descriptive question tends to be conflated with the tougher normative
questions of whether prostitution should be treated as a form of work
like any other, and whether it is fair that poor women have such
limited economic options. We simply argue in this Article that one
may make an economic analysis of prostitution that relates it to
women's comparative poverty and yet not automatically embrace
legitimating sexual labor.
Although saying that selling sex is an employment or
profession may be disputed, few dispute that prostitutes do not
perform this work out of pleasure or love, but rather for economic
gain. Like any other job, if they did not get paid, they would not be
there. Former sex worker Amber Hollibaugh writes,
[T]he bottom line for any woman in the sex trade is
economics. However a woman feels when she finally gets
into the life, it always begins as survival; -the rent, the
kids, the drugs, pregnancy, financing an abortion, running
away from home, being undocumented, having a "bad"
reputation, incest-it always starts at trying to get by. 135
Even sex workers who say they enjoy their work still
acknowledge it is a livelihood. Peggy Miller, a member of the
Canadian Organization for the Rights of Prostitutes, said in a public
discussion, "What is so terrible about fucking for a living? I like it, I
133. Don Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory 246 (1989).
134. Rep. Holman of Indiana, Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2962
(1864), speaking in the debate over the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment,
cited in VanderVelde, supra note 125, at n.37.
135. Amber Hollibaugh, On the Street Where We Live, Women's Review of
Books 1, 1 (1988) (book review).
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can live out my fantasies."'36 Another sex worker challenged her
claim: "I don't know how you can possibly say. .. that you like every
sexual act, that you work out your fantasies! Come on, get serious..
.. Can you count how many tricks you have had? You mean you have
that many fantasies? Isn't it about having money to survive? '37
Yet with the exception of only a privileged few, as Martha
Nussbaum observes, all adults in the world economy must sell their
labor power for some part of its value in order to obtain the means to
support themselves and those dependent on them. '38 The press of
economic survival falls especially hard on women who increasingly
are the sole support for a household, and yet face declining real
wages, a lower wage structure than men, and job segregation that
concentrates female labor into market sectors and industries with
little job security, uncertain hours, and few or no benefits. At the
same time, the global spread of neoliberal economics means states
are withdrawing the public welfare support that once aided women
in caring for families outside of the wage economy. Regarding
prostitution's relationship to the limited range of employment
options for poor women, Nussbaum invokes Joseph Raz's powerful
image of the "hounded woman," a woman on a desert island who is
constantly pursued by a flesh-eating animal. 39 This woman is free to
go anywhere on the island and do anything she pleases, but she is
also quite unfree. If she wants not to be eaten, she must devote all
her talents and material resources to avoiding the beast. She
exercises the outer forms of human agency, but she has no real
choices.
Many poor people's lives are nonautonomous in just this way.
They possess autonomy in that they are capable of making bargains
and of reflecting about what to do. But this matters little if the
struggle for survival gives them just one or a very few miserable
options. Yet society remains willing to accept the "choices" that poor
people make to survive under these conditions as good enough to be
deemed "consensual."'4 ° For example, although labor mandated by
136. From the Floor, in Good Girls, Bad Girls: Sex Trade Workers and
Feminists Face to Face 48, 48 (Laurie Bell ed., 1987) (quoting Peggy Miller).
137. Id. at 49-50.
138. Martha C. Nussbaum, "Whether From Reason or Prejudice": Taking
Money for Bodily Services, 27 J. Legal Stud. 693, 693-94 (1998).
139. Id. at 721 (citing Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 374 (1986)).
140. Maria Lugones's observations about agency are illuminating. She
refers to the liberal idea of individual agency as a "fiction ... that fits both the
strategist [and] the powerful," those charged with upholding the "institutional
2006]
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the state as a condition for continued public assistance has been
called a form of slavery, these claims have failed as a matter of law in
U.S. courts.14 ' The enforcement of the universal obligation to work
associated with welfare reform suggests, in fact, that we are growing
more, rather than less, inured to this impoverished vision of
autonomy, at least as regards poor women and men. This argument
recurs in the current debate over prostitution. Autonomy advocates
contend that any prohibition or regulation of prostitution denies
agency to the prostitute. Yet without access to other economic
strategies for survival, is her individual agency an illusion?142
Nonetheless, Thanh-Dam Trd6ng, in her study of Southeast
Asian prostitution, defines "work" precisely at this basic level of
survival-she sees human work as a means towards meeting basic
'apparatus.'" Maria Lugones, Pilgrimates/Peregrinajes 210 (2003). By veiling the
particular and specific cogency of individual agency only for the structures and
holders of power, the fiction creates an enticement for the illusion that all actors
possess such individual agency. Instead, in reality, the fiction permits the
entrenchment of the status quo by valorizing the atomistic and atomized
individual who is a holder of power in powerful structures. Thus agency (or
"intentionality" to use Lugones's term), generally defined and understood to be
possessed by all individuals, is truly owned only by those with power who control
the dominant power structures. As such, ideas of individual agency are both
rhetorical and "conceptual devices that pervade or constitute the underpinnings
of dominant moral and legal discourse and they are used in vicious and
contradictory ways against those who are the subjects of strategic control." Id. at
210-11.
In this dissection of the concept of individual agency, only the acts of the powerful
are consonant with the social, economic, and political structures that both define
agency and support its exercise. The compatibility of desire between agent and
structure enables the will of power-the hegemon, the patriarch. On the other
hand, as Lugones notes, the subordinate, the oppressed, the subaltern "cannot
exercise agency since they either enact a subordinate or a resistant
intentionality." Id. at 211. Intentionality is coherent only when both the actors
are in the structures of power. Thus the qualified intentionality of the subjugated
"disqualifies [them] from agency in the first case." Id.
141. See, e.g, Brogan v. San Mateo County, 901 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1990);
Dublino v. New York State Dep't of Soc Services, 348 F. Supp. 290 (W.D.N.Y.
1972).
142. Sylvia Law describes the opposition of her indigent female clients to
the legalization of prostitution in Nevada when it was being debated there in the
early 1970s. These women recognized that if sex work was lawful, such labor
might be required of them as a condition of public assistance. These women's
social location allowed them to cast into doubt any notion that calling prostitution
"work" strips the practice of compulsion. Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond
Decriminalization, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 523, 600-01 (2000).
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needs and reproducing human life.1 43 Sexuality is a productive life
force available to women and men as a valuable asset to trade with
or a resource to be strategically employed. Tr66ng argues that the
purely sexual elements of the body and the sexual .energies of the
personality can be used for survival and sustenance, just as they may
be used for pleasure.'44
This linking of sexual service with economic livelihood
conflicts with culturally-valued ideals of sexuality as grounded in
intimacy. By this ideal, sexual services are acts of social production
and reproduction, and thus may meet Trii6ng's definition of work.
But they are rightly to be exchanged only in relationships of altruism
and reciprocity on a noncommodified basis. Yet there are elements of
bargain and exchange even in marriage, and also in many other
sexual interactions that the law permits. 145 Additionally, all the other
work of social production and reproduction that traditionally has
been exchanged on the basis of altruism and reciprocity is now
routinely bought and sold as a commodity in labor markets. We
regularly hire cleaning women, cooks, nannies, babysitters, and even
mail-order brides.
Even for those who reject the "sex work" characterization,
there might be reason to treat adult, voluntary prostitution as work
if this characterization would open avenues by which to ameliorate
some of its misery. One perverse outcome, however, of getting caught
up in the distinction between voluntary and forced prostitution is the
implicit suggestion that society need concern itself only with the
"innocent" subjected to coercion and not the "guilty" woman who
chooses her path. This has the pernicious effect of overlooking those
already working in the sex industry. 46 Although violence, coercion,
duress, and deceit bring some into prostitution (the victims of
"forced" prostitution), abuse, confinement, debt-bondage, and slavery-
like conditions are also problems faced by those already working in
the trade (the "voluntary" prostitutes). Feminist concerns for
prostitution must address not just the means of entry into the trade,
but also the conditions of life and work for those already there.
143. Than-Dam Trd6ng, Sex, Money and Morality: The Political Economy
of Prostitution and Tourism in South East Asia 73-75 (1990).
144. Id. at 67-92.
145. See generally Larson & Hirshman, supra note 6 (examining the
elements of bargain and exchange that are present in the sexual community and
suggesting a new structure of sexual regulation that recognizes the inherent
political relationships between partners).
146. See Doezema, supra note 38, at 42.
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Our bottom line, however, is that even if prostitution is
regarded as work, which for the moment we will not dispute, it does
not automatically become an acceptable form of freely chosen labor. If
prostitution is forced or compulsory labor, exploitative labor, or
discriminatory labor, its voluntary nature will not insulate the
practice from challenge under human rights principles. 147
V. BEYOND CONSENT: SUBSTANTIVELY JUST LABOR STANDARDS
Anne McClintock observes that "[h]istorically the
international labor movement has argued for the radical
transformation of labor, not its abolition." 48 Advocates for the
autonomy perspective seem to assume that once labor law steps in,
prostitution would be legitimated because these laws represent
power to regulate but not to abolish. Yet McClintock's history is only
partially accurate. This account cannot explain, for example, the role
of free labor advocates in defeating slavery. 149 One of the labor
movement's approaches to "radical transformation" has been the
effort to eliminate work deemed inhumane or irremediably
dangerous to the worker.
Accordingly, international law protects all workers from
bondage, forced, or discriminatory labor, and protects child workers
from categories of work deemed unduly exploitative. 5 0 These kinds of
work are subject to abolition in the name of labor rights as human
rights. As we have argued, the conception of labor rights as human
rights means that consent does not insulate a labor practice from
critique or abolition. Rather, respecting the human rights of the
worker requires a definition in substance rather than form of what is
free as opposed to unfree labor. Having said this, we want to
acknowledge the difficulty of defining substantive standards of just
labor conditions, even in only one sector of the labor market, such as
sexual labor. We find some resources in existing international
standards addressing slavery, as well as practices similar to
slavery 5' and forced or compulsory labor. 5 2 But the leading edge of
147. These are three of the core labor rights as human rights recognized by
the ILO. The fourth is the right of free association. See supra note 105 and
accompanying text.
148. Anne McClintock, Sex Workers and Sex Work: Introduction, 37 Social
Text 1, 8 (1993).
149. See Stanley, supra note 5, at 60-97.
150. See international declarations and conventions en passim.
151. Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253 (entered into
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labor rights thinking is the recent effort to define what labor is so
exploitative as to impair human dignity and full personhood. 153 We
discuss each of these in turn.
A. Slavery and Practices Similar to Slavery
The term "slavery" is defined in international law as "the
status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers of
ownership are exercised."1 54 The ILO conventions prohibit this labor
relation.'5 5 Voluntariness is not an issue. We ask instead whether
working conditions short of slavery satisfy human rights standards.
Because the legal prohibition of slavery and similar practices is well
established in international law,'5 6 these labor relations are not the
principal focus of this Article.
Illegal practices "similar to slavery" include the following:
force Mar. 9, 1927) [hereinafter Slavery Convention]; Supplementary Convention
on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices
Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1957, 226 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Apr. 30, 1957)
[hereinafter Supplementary Slavery Convention].
152. Forced Labour Convention, supra note 104; see also Abolition of
Forced Labour Convention, supra note 104.
153. Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 1999, ILO No. 182
[hereinafter Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour].
154. Slavery Convention, supra note 151, art. 1(1). The Supplementary
Slavery Convention defines '[a] person of servile status" as "a person in the
condition or status resulting from any of the institutions or practices mentioned
in article I of this Convention.... " Supplementary Slavery Convention, supra
note 151, art. 7(b). Article 1 of the Convention provides that
Each of the States Parties to this Convention shall take all
practicable and necessary legislative and other measures to
bring about progressively and as soon as possible the complete
abolition or abandonment of the following institutions and
practices, where they still exist and whether or not they are
covered by the definition of slavery contained in article 1 of the
Slavery Convention....
Id., art. 1.
"Servitude," although expressly prohibited, is not specifically defined in
international law; but where the term is used, it is understood that the practices
defined as "similar to slavery" are servitude. See, e.g., International Law
Dictionary and Directory, http://raymondaugust.com/pubs/dict/s.htm (last visited
Oct. 30, 2005) (defining servitude as "(From Latin servitudo: 'slavery'.) A right to
the use of another's property.").
155. Slavery Convention, supra note 151, art. 2; Supplementary Slavery
Convention, supra note 151.
156. Supplementary Slavery Convention, supra note 151.
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(a) Debt bondage, that is to say, the status or condition
arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal
services or of those of a person under his control as
security for a debt, if the value of those services as
reasonably assessed is not applied towards the
liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those
services are not respectively limited and defined;
(b) Serfdom, that is to say, the condition or status of a
tenant who is by law, custom or agreement bound to
live and labour on land belonging to another person
and to render some determinate service to such other
person, whether for reward or not, and is not free to
change his status;
(c) Any institution or practice whereby:
(i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised
or given in marriage on payment of a
consideration in money or in kind to her parents,
guardian, family or any other person or group; or
(ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan,
has the right to transfer her to another person for
value received or otherwise; or
(iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to
be inherited by another person;
(d) Any institution or practice whereby a child or young
person under the age of 18 years, is delivered by either
or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to
another person, whether for reward or not, with a view
to the exploitation of the child or young person or of his
labour. I
Activist/advocates and scholars have documented many
practices of the sex industry worldwide that meet these existing
definitions of slavery and practices similar to slavery. Women and
children are openly bought and sold for prostitution. Children are
pledged to sexual labor by their parents in order to satisfy family
debt. Prostitutes are subjected to forms of strategic violence and
coercion intended to restrain liberty, including the right to choose or
reject sexual labor. Pimps may abduct, beat, or rape a prostitute in
order to force her to return when she seeks to leave the life or chooses
to work for another. She may be threatened regarding custody of a
child or immigration status. Some prostitutes are held in a condition
of debt bondage by which pimps or brothel owners lend money, goods,
or credit, or require women to purchase food and supplies at
157. Id.,at art. 1(a)-(d).
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exorbitant rates, and then hold them to work off the debt. Where
women enter prostitution in order to work and send money home to
their families, this debt bondage may be perpetual. These conditions
of labor parallel the prohibited relations of slavery and similar
practices. 158
In addition, pimps often seek broad control over the
prostitute and her labor in more subtle and indirect ways. For
example, the pimp may instigate and encourage substance abuse,
may sexually and romantically involve himself with the prostitute, or
may exploit a condition of previous sexual abuse. Such forms of
emotional and addictive servitude, like debt bondage, may be
voluntary, but nonetheless are coercive. 59 Although not currently
treated as such, we believe these, too, should be regarded as a form of
servitude under existing human rights standards.
B. Forced or Compulsory Labor
The ILO conventions also prohibit forced labor, defined as "all
work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace
of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself
voluntarily."160 As we have argued above, this is an impoverished
understanding of forced labor, one that focuses solely on either
violence or voluntarism.16' The liberal distinction between free and
unfree labor demands not just the worker's consent, but also
substantive conditions of labor that assure both the worker's liberty
and dignity. 62 The thickly protective structure of labor and
employment law, adopted in many nations in accordance with these
ideals, indicates that broadly equitable conditions of work-
established directly through baseline rules and indirectly through
enhanced bargaining power-are essential for the wage labor
158. Hermndez-Truyol & Larson, supra note 43.
159. Beverly Balos and Mary Louise Fellows drafted a statute to create a
civil cause of action for women pressed into prostitution by these forms of
coercion not currently recognized as such under law. Beverly Balos & Mary L.
Fellows, A Matter of Prostitution: Becoming Respectable, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1220,
1223 (1999) (enacted as Minn. Stat. Ann. § 611A.81(1)(a), 611A.80(2)(5), (11),
(12), (14), (17) (West Supp. 1999), but later repealed).
160. Forced Labour Convention, supra note 104, art. 2.1; see also ILO
Declaration, supra note 105 (providing that all ILO members have an obligation
to respect, promote, and realize the fundamental rights of the Conventions,
including "the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour").
161. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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contract to be legitimated. Thus, we believe the analyses of forced
and exploitative labor, to which we turn next, collapse: the best
evidence of lack of force or compulsion is not voluntarism, but rather
whether workers enjoy minimally reasonable and just conditions of
work.
There are aspects of the new Trafficking Protocol 63 that
indicate potential areas of expansion of ideas of "force" or
"compulsion" as applied to commercial sex. The definition of
trafficking in Article 3 of the Protocol includes the movement of
persons by means of threat, force, or other forms of coercion
including: abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or a position of
vulnerability, or giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person
for the purpose of exploitation.' 64 The definition extends beyond
conventional criminal law notions of coercion and duress, or even of
fraud and deception, to include exploitation by abuse of social or
cultural authority or of a position of vulnerability. For example, the
situation of an immigrant, a woman, or an ethnic or racial minority
(or someone who is all three) could be included. 65 The travaux
pr4paratoires16 6 -preparatory works that assist in the interpretation
of the Trafficking Protocol - indicate that this "reference to the abuse
of a position of vulnerability is understood to refer to any situation in
163. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 26.
164. Id., art. 3(a).
165. In the negotiations over the Trafficking Protocol, the Network of Sex
Work Projects urged nations not to adopt the Protocol on the grounds that the
broad definition of trafficking contained therein exceeded existing definitions of
forced or compulsory labor. See Network of Sex Work Projects, supra note 27. The
International Human Rights Law Group (IHRL), a member of the coalition,
objected to the definition of trafficking on the grounds that it "ha[d] too many
elements that would have to be proven by prosecutors, thus making prosecutions
more difficult." Jordan, supra note 27, at 7. IHRL also described the trafficking
definition as "ambiguous," objecting fundamentally that the terms used therein
are new to the international rights field and thus not already defined in other
human rights instruments. Id. The group proposed instead a narrower criminal
law definition that limits trafficking to the movement of persons "for forced
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the
removal of organs." Id.
166. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime on the Work of Its First to Eleventh
Session, Addendum: Interpretative Notes for the Official Records (Travaux
Prdparatoires) of the Negotiation of the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, Nov. 3, 2000
[hereinafter Travaux Priparatoires], available at http'J/www.unodc.orgpdf/
crime/final instruments/383ale.pdf.
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which the person involved has no real and acceptable alternative but
to submit to the abuse involved." 167 It is important to remember that
the Trafficking Protocol applies only to cross-border trafficking and
not to the domestic sex industry. A similarly broad definition applied
to domestic sex work would broaden the kinds of sexual labor that
would fall within existing international agreements against forced or
compulsory labor.
The Trafficking Protocol also opens the door to consideration
of the fundamental question of economic compulsion, which also
exceeds conventional criminal law definitions of force or coercion.
Unacceptable practices may include "the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person."168 Note that giving payment is not alone
enough; the payment must be made by a person "having control over
another person. If the explication given by the travaux
prdparatoires to the "abuse of authority or position of vulnerability"
language also applies to the "payment" language, then the idea of
economic compulsion applies only in the instance where "the person
involved has no real and acceptable alternative but to submit."1 70
This would be a comparatively narrow extension of conventional
ideas of involuntariness, but nonetheless would prevent the payment
of a wage alone to disguise and thus legitimate the worker's lack of
real choices.
C. Exploitative Labor
The category of "exploitative" labor practice is still mostly
undefined in international law, although it holds tremendous
promise as a labor rights standard. The most forthright human
rights intervention has addressed the worst forms of exploitative
child labor.17' The Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour
167. Id., art. 3(a)(63).
168. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 26, art. 3(a).
169. Id.
170. Travaux Priparatoires, supra note 166, art. 3(a)(63).
171. See Convention of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, supra note 153;
see also Juan Somavia, Director-General of the International Labour Office,
Special Dialogue on Child Rights at the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights: Child Marginalization, Child Labour and the ILO's Response to It
(Apr. 14, 1999), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/dgo/speeches/somavia/
1999/child.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2005) (noting that "[c]hild labor" is, according
to the ILO, "the single most important source of child exploitation and abuse in
the world today").
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defines the "worst forms of labor" as follows:
(a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such
as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and
serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including
forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in
armed conflict;
(b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution,
for the production of pornography or for pornographic
performances;
(c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit
activities, in particular for the production and
trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant
international treaties;
(d) work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which
it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or
morals of children.'
72
To generalize from these principles, four factors characterize
exploitative labor for children: (1) work that meets existing standards
of slavery or forced labor, (2) culturally stigmatized or degrading
work, (3) the illegality of the work itself, and (4) harmful or
dangerous conditions that interfere with human development and
capacity. By these definitions, unacceptable work may be paid or
unpaid; significantly, the presence of a wage does not determine the
work's exploitative character.
Even with children, not all forms of work are deemed harmful
or exploitative. Under the Convention on Worst Forms of Child
Labour, work is exploitative for children if it violates established
international law standards.'73 A second factor in identifying
exploitation is the child's relegation to culturally stigmatized or
degrading work. 174 Naturally, cultural values shape how children
172. Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, supra note 153, art.
3(a)-(d).
173. For specific prohibitions of the worst forms of child labor, see
Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, supra note 153, art. 3(a)-(d).
174. See id., art. 4(1) (providing that "[tihe types of work referred to under
Article 3(d) shall be determined by national laws or regulations or by the
competent authority, after consultation with the organizations of employers and
workers concerned, taking into consideration relevant international standards, in
particular Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Worst Forms of Child Labour
Recommendation, 1999").
Recommendation 1999 provides, at paragraph 3, that:
in identifying where the [worst forms of child labor) exist,
consideration should be given, inter alia, to: (a) work which
exposes children to physical, psychological or sexual abuse; (b)
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work throughout the world.' 5 Children have human rights along
economic, social, and cultural dimensions from which they should be
able to benefit in lasting, active, and nondiscriminatory ways. 7 6 The
Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour determines that the
work underground, under water, at dangerous heights or in
confined spaces; (c) work with dangerous machinery,
equipment and tools, or which involves the manual handling or
transport of heavy loads; (d) work in an unhealthy
environment which may, for example, expose children to
hazardous substances, agents or processes, or to temperatures,
noise levels, or vibrations damaging to their health; (e) work
under particularly difficult conditions such as work for long
hours or during the night or work where the child is
unreasonably confined to the premises of the employer.
International Labor Organization, Worst Forms of Child Labour
Recommendation (R190), 1999, at 3, http://www.logosnet.net/ilo/150_base/
en/instr/r_190.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2005). At paragraph 4, it further explains
that
[flor the types of work referred to under Article 3(d) of the
Convention and Paragraph 3 above, national laws or
regulations or the competent authority could, after
consultation with the workers' and employers' organizations
concerned, authorize employment or work as from the age of 16
on condition that the health, safety and morals of the children
concerned are fully protected, and that the children have
received adequate specific instruction or vocational training in
the relevant branch of activity.
Id., 14.
175. The ILO recognizes and respects, but does not defer to, the cultural
factor in children's labor:
Since child labour often leads to a violation of these rights, the
industrialized countries as a whole recognize the need to
combat this problem as it interferes with the normal physical
and mental development of the child. In many developing
countries this perception of the child-and it is worth noting
that this is a recent perception even in Europe-is still in total
contradiction with age-old traditions and social conventions
which see the child as being a member of its community or clan
and not as an "individual being" having the right of expression.
Therefore children are obliged to bend to the code of conduct
implicit in their group and to the prevailing division of labour
which complies with parameters of age and sex-even if these
are dangerous for a child's normal development.
Statement by Mr. Michel Hansenne, Director-General, International Labour
Office, Child Labour: Refusing the Intolerable (Feb. 16, 1998), http://www-ilo-
mirror.cornell.edu/public/english/bureau/dgo/speeches/hansenne/1998/ottigni.htm
(last visited Oct. 30, 2005).
176. See Children's Convention, supra note 14, Preamble, arts. 2, 4.
2006] 435
HeinOnline  -- 37 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 435 2005-2006
436 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [37:391
child's human rights should prevail over family, culture, or nation.'77
The child worker, like the adult worker, enjoys the ILO's core labor
rights as human rights, which includes the right to benefit from
nondiscrimination.1
7 8
Children are often put to labor that degrades and diminishes
their status, such as begging, below-wage farm labor, drug-running
and -spotting, pornography, and prostitution. This segmentation of
the labor market manifests the child's powerlessness and constitutes
a form of discrimination. As with children, for adults some forms of
discrimination involve excluding a group from employment; another
form assigns degrading or stigmatizing work to a particular group.
79
Such designations can meet the standard of culturally stigmatizing
or degrading work in an adult context.
A third reason that child exploitation occurs is illegality. In
countries where the child's work is illegal, the child has no legal
protection for his or her working conditions. The ILO regards
workers outside of the scope of protected legislation as unprotected
workers. A child prohibited from work in many settings and
conditions may still be working in the informal sector, where general
conditions of work are often degrading and social services and
benefits incident either to childhood or work are absent.'80 This
suggests that appropriate regulation, rather than absolute
177. See Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, supra note 153.
178. See, e.g., ILO Declaration, supra note 105. The Declaration embodies
the principle that: "all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the
right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in
conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity."
International Labor Organization, ILO Declarations, International Labour
Conventions and Recommendations, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/comp/
civil/standards/ilodcr.htm (last modified Mar. 15, 2001).
179. Just as some work is reserved for children, we note here that some
work in the commercial sex industry is predominantly reserved for women and
those gendered "female," including gay youth and transsexuals.
180. Children working in illegal conditions "are unaware of their legal
rights." Valentina Forastieri, Children at Work: Health and Safety Risks 131 (2d
ed., 2002), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/support/publ/chilwork.pdf (last
visited Dec. 9, 2005). If it is illegal to hire children for particular jobs, it is
difficult to identify children working there and to provide them with any legal
protection. On the other hand, "[iun the case of the informal sector, exploitation
and child abuse are more widespread, have different levels and can lead to
extreme situations such as exposing children to criminality and prostitution,
where they are completely unprotected." Id. at 90-91. "As children are not
supposed to be employed, there is no legislation protecting them even from the
most dangerous and arduous work." Id. at 4.
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prohibition, may well improve the well-being of some of these child
laborers.
A final factor in children's exploitation is work that interferes
with the human development or capacity of the child worker.
Children have the right to develop along the many dimensions of
human capacity: mental, physical, social, moral, and spiritual.'8 ' Any
work preventing this development exploits a child. By contrast, work
that does not detract from a child's essential activities (e.g., play and
education) is not necessarily exploitative. Focusing on the
development of a child's human capacities rather than voluntariness
has allowed the international community to conclude, in one specific
example, that prostitution under any conditions is an unacceptably
exploitative practice for children.
182
Can we apply the exploitation paradigm to the labor of
adults? The Trafficking Protocol 183 applies to adult workers and uses
the term "exploitation," but meaningfully fails to define the term
other than to observe that it includes "the exploitation of the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation."' 84 This
definition remains tautological due to unresolvable conflicts among
the states negotiating about the effect the agreement might have on
national laws regarding domestic prostitution. The travaux
prdparatoires provide that the agreement is to have no impact on the
purely domestic sex trade:
[Tihe Protocol addresses the exploitation of the prostitution
of others and other forms of sexual exploitation only in the
context of trafficking in persons. The terms "exploitation of
the prostitution of others" or "other forms of sexual
exploitation" are not defined in the Protocol, which is
therefore without prejudice to how States Parties address
prostitution in their respective domestic laws.
18 5
181. The goal is to eradicate "work which, by its nature or the
circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or
morals of children." Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, supra note
153, art 3(d). See also Art. 32 of the Children's Convention providing that
children are entitled "to be protected from economic exploitation and from
performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's
education, or to be harmful to the child's health or physical, mental, spiritual,
moral or social development." Children's Convention, supra note 14, art 32(1).
182. See Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, supra note 153,
art. 3.
183. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 26.
184. Id., art. 3(a).
185. Travaux Prdparatoires, supra note 166, art. 3(a)(64).
20061
HeinOnline  -- 37 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 437 2005-2006
438 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [37:391
The more developed standards of child exploitation thus
remain the most explicit labor standards available for considering
the issue of exploitation in adult sexual labor or adult labor in any
sector.
Measured against and generalizing from the standards of
exploitative labor developed in the child labor setting, we suggest
that voluntary adult prostitution would violate the core labor rights
as human rights if it (1) interferes with the human capacities of adult
persons; (2) is racially- and gender-subordinating, hence
discriminatory; or (3) is illegal in ways that leave workers
unprotected. We use these principles in our analysis by example and
analogy. We do not intend to infantilize adult women by the analogy,
nor to suggest that women of age be denied agency as is regularly
done with minors.186 But children and youth, like adult women and
men, share common human characteristics. To the extent that these
basic human qualities are affected by working conditions, the labor
rules that suit the young may have adaptations appropriate to
adults.
VI. A CALL FOR EMPIRICISM AND A PROPOSED STANDARD FOR
EXPLOITATIVE LABOR
If we applied the discussed indicia of exploitative child labor
to adult, voluntary prostitution, what would we conclude? Until
locally-grounded empirical work is done to paint for us detailed
pictures of the conditions of sexual labor in the various parts of the
world, we cannot make definitive conclusions about the nature of
sexual labor. Once depth of knowledge has been established, all sides
in the debate will have at least a common factual basis for theoretical
generalization and policy development. Our project aims to spur this
work. With the incompleteness of existing knowledge at hand,
especially in cross-cultural contexts, we can only suggest the kind of
questions researchers might ask. Our overarching goal is to open
these inquiries, not to definitively conclude them.
A. Illegality
Only the latter condition-illegality--can be mitigated by a
186. But see supra note 140 for a discussion of the constraints on the
agency of subordinated persons.
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move either to decriminalization or legalization,'87 the policy options
supported (sometimes reluctantly) by advocates of both abolition and
autonomy.'8 8 Criminalization prevents the exercise of core labor
rights, notably the right to organize and freedom of association;
decriminalization or legalization would allow the enjoyment of these
rights. 89 Sexual labor-like other low-status labor-would likely still
be underpaid and exploited even if it were not illegal. But the
prostitute's almost complete isolation from the law's protections-
civil, criminal, and constitutional-would end. Especially from the
perspective of nations that have criminalized prostitution (the United
States among them), it is essential to consider whether
decriminalization/legalization would meaningfully change working
conditions in the sex industry.
Some aspects of the working conditions of prostitutes are
directly related to its illegality by virtue of criminalization, and so
could be partially addressed by decriminalization or legalization.
Illegality drives much of the industry into the shadows, shielding
business practices from scrutiny under ordinary legal standards.
Because children and prostitutes often work outside the law's limits,
they are both subject to the exploitation that follows from being
criminalized and marginalized by living in an informal sector.
Criminalization has led to widespread police corruption and
sexual abuse of prostitutes. In many countries, sex workers are de
facto (if not de jure) denied the protection of the laws against sexual
assault, battery, fraud, and even murder:
[WIomen who work as prostitutes . . . are frequently
harassed, manipulated, and exploited by police officers and
others who have power over them. Criminalization
contributes to the stigma that prostitutes bear, making
them more vulnerable to hate crimes, housing and
employment discrimination, and other violations of their
basic rights.
190
But does experience with legalization indicate that this policy
will solve these abuses? This is a crucial question for researchers to
explore, building towards comparative work that can synthesize the
187. There is no official definition of decriminalization or legalization, but
decriminalization usually implies repealing all laws against commercial sex,
whereas legalization often implies more than simple decriminalization-it may
include laws put in place to control prostitution, such as licensing.
188. See supra Section II.A.1, II.A.2.
189. Id.
190. Shrage, supra note 31, at 42.
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relevant factors in living under a legal regime of decriminalization as
opposed to a regime of legalization. We are somewhat skeptical that
legalization will resolve the problems of criminalization because it is
not law alone that leads to the degradation and disregard of
prostitutes; it is also the nature of the work itself and the social
relations it creates that make sex workers vulnerable to coercion,
abuse, and exploitation. If it is the work of commercial sex and the
relations it creates, and not just its legal status, that proves to be
harmful, bringing adult prostitution out of the informal sector of the
labor market might alter, but perhaps would not fundamentally
transform, underlying conditions. Therefore, we believe that the case
can be made now for partial decriminalization as a mandate of
international law in order to protect the fundamental labor and
human rights of sex workers to organize and freely associate. The
alternative of legalization, however, requires careful empirical study.
B. Race- and Gender-Subordination
Freedom from discrimination is one of the ILO's core labor
rights as human rights.1 9' Some of the limited available empirical
evidence suggests that the market for commercial sexual services is
strongly marked by gender, age, and race/ethnic disparities, although
the pattern varies from country to country. The market in sex almost
everywhere consists of mostly adult, male patrons of adult female sex
workers, but also of child prostitutes of both sexes. In many
countries, there are also marked racial and ethnic disparities.
Sex-discriminatory aspects of the broader labor market may
in part explain the existence of prostitution. But if discrimination is
an underlying cause of women's disproportionate presence as sexual
laborers, this undermines the legitimacy of the practice vis-a-vis
human rights norms. In many settings, sex work is one of women's
best economic options. This follows a history in which women were
prohibited from engaging in many forms of work, and labored under
discriminatory conditions because of gender norms. Set against the
human rights guarantees of nondiscrimination and equality, 9 2 these
cultural values cannot justify differential treatment in domestic
law. 93 Further, if prostitution persists because cultural norms
191. See supra note 105.
192. See U.N. Charter, art. 1(3); Universal Declaration, supra note 30, arts.
2, 7; ICCPR, supra note 30, arts. 2, 26; ICESCR, supra note 30, art. 2; CEDAW,
supra note 12, passim (provisions on nondiscrimination and equality).
193. Even differences drawn from cultural stereotypes or traditional
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identify women as good for little besides sex, these beliefs promote
prostitution and, at the same time, discourage other economic
opportunities for women. From this perspective, prostitution appears
to be an obstacle to women's nondiscriminatory access to work in
violation of their fundamental rights.
Mostly female prostitutes sell access to their intimate body,
sexual service, time, and intellectual and emotional labor for mostly
male profit and consumption. This commodification of female
characteristics in accord with sexualized gender roles stigmatizes
women as objects and reaffirms women's subordinated status. If such
commodification is based on cultural debasement or social
marginality, it conflicts with women's basic human right to equality
and dignity, and their freedom from discrimination in accord with
the idea of core labor rights as human rights.
C. Work that Impairs Human Development and Capability
There is a consensus that exploitative work for children
involves: too many hours spent working; work that exerts undue
physical, social, or psychological stress; inadequate pay; and
impairment of normal development and expression of human
capacities. 194 These judgments are grounded in a valuation of child
development and a child's expanding expression of human capacities.
Some human tasks and capacities of adults differ from those
of children. Yet this way of asking the question of exploitative labor
applies equally to both. We propose a "human capability" standard as
images of women are affected by this guarantee of equality and
nondiscrimination. See CEDAW, supra note 12, arts. 3, 5, 10(c), 13(c). See also
ICCPR, supra note 30, art. 27; Universal Declaration, supra note 30, art. 27
(provisions on culture).
194. UNICEF stipulates a number of criteria to further specify work that
"by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the
health, safety or morals of children," a criterion in the Convention on Worst
Forms of Child Labour, supra note 153, art. 3(d). These criteria include:
" full-time work at too early an age;
" too many hours spent working;
" work that exerts undue physical, social or psychological
stress;
" inadequate pay;...
" work that hampers access to education....
UNICEF, What Is Child Labour, in The State of the World's Children 1997
(1997), available in part at http://www.unicef.org/sowc97/report/what.htm (last
visited Oct. 30, 2005).
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the measure against which we should judge exploitation in labor
practices, and weigh these practices against human rights norms.
Amartya Sen argues that a state that respects full
personhood must embrace the maximization of human capability:
[Tihe literature on human capital tends to concentrate on
the agency of human beings in augmenting production
possibilities. The perspective of human capability focuses,
on the other hand, on the ability-the substantive
freedom-of people to lead the lives they have reason to
value and to enhance the real choices they have. The two
perspectives cannot but be related. 
195
Work that does not exploit must allow people to live a life
they have reason to value and, at the least, not impair the real
choices they have. Thus work that harms or exhausts the body or
spirit, that diminishes the person, or that impairs fundamental
human activities, such as rest/restoration, practical reason/learning,
or intimacy, is work that is as dangerous to the adult as to the child.
Here, more than with respect to any of the other measures of
exploitativeness, we need serious empirical investigation in broadly
cross-cultural settings. For example, in a recently released report,
Blood, Sweat, and Fear: Workers' Rights in U.S. Meat and Poultry
Plants,196 Human Rights Watch (HRW) contends that the "conditions,
vulnerabilities, and abuses" that the workers face in the meat and
poultry industry constitute human rights violations.' 97  These
conditions include "dangerous jobs in difficult conditions .. .[which
constitute] hazardous and exhausting labor,"' 98 work under "constant
fear and risk ... [with] high rates of injury,"' 99 and fear of loss of job if
"they exercise their rights to organize and bargain collectively in an
attempt to improve working conditions."2 0 0 Significantly, simply
195. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom 293 (1999). See also Martha
Nussbaum's work on women and development in Women, Culture, and
Development (Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1995) (advocating
for a capabilities-focused philosophy, which is superior to a utilitarian-economic
philosophy, when analyzing the problems of women in developing countries).
196. Human Rights Watch, Blood, Sweat, and Fear: Workers' Rights in
U.S. Meat and Poultry Plants (2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/
2005/usa0105/usa0105.pdf.
197. Id., at 1.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1. The report specifies that "[wiorking in the meatpacking or
poultry industry is notoriously dangerous ... [and common injuries include:]
scars, swellings, rashes, amputations, blindness, or other afflictions." Id. at 29.
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because work is physically demanding does not render the type of
work a per se human rights violation. Such work only violates human
rights norms when the responsible party does not take any
preventative measures and practices result in injury or death, and
where the hazards have been scientifically established and "are
preventable with economically feasible health and safety precautions
and practices. "2° 1
The HRW report utilizes the same international human
rights referenced in this article to identify working conditions that
constitute human rights violations. Specifically, the report cites the
Universal Declaration's mandate of "just and favourable conditions of
work";20 2 the ICESCR requirement that every person has a right "to
the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which
ensure, in particular.., safe and healthy working conditions";20 3 ILO
Convention No. 155 on Occupational Safety and Health calling for
policies "to prevent accidents and injuries to health . . . by
minimizing . . . the causes of hazards inherent in the working
environment";2°' and the U.N.'s Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights General Comment No. 3 which advocates "a
minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights."2 °5
In its use of sources, the HRW report suggests a framework
for studying sexual labor as a human rights violation.20 6 The working
conditions detailed in the report, like the working conditions in much
of prostitution, impair the workers' human capabilities, thus eroding
Many injuries are what the medical profession labels as "traumatic injuries,
distinct from the endemic phenomenon in the industry of repetitive stress or
musculoskeletal injury." Id. at 31. The report details the dangerous conditions as
due to line speed (id. at 33-38), close-quarters cutting (id. at 38-39), heavy lifting
(id. at 39-40), sullied work conditions (id. at 40-43), and inadequate training and
equipment (id. at 43-47). These risks and fears are heightened, in particular, for
immigrant workers whose language skills hinder them from understanding
existing work hazards and from knowing their legal rights. Id. at 1, 101-17.
Moreover, those who lack of documentation also face the risk of deportation if
they seek to exercise their labor rights to improve their working conditions. Id. at
1.
201. Id. at 47.
202. Id. at 25 (quoting Universal Declaration, supra note 30, art. 23).
203. Id. (quoting ICESCR, supra note 30, art. 7).
204. Id. (quoting ILO Occupational Health and Safety Convention, No. 155,
1981).
205. Id. (quoting U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 3, U.N. ESCOR, 1990, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, 1 10).
206. Id. at 25-28.
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their human dignity. Limited available empirical evidence suggests
that the market for commercial sexual services, like the market for
labor in the meat and poultry industry, is marked by: abusive
working conditions; serious impairment of worker health and
wellbeing; indignities; and unfair exchanges of either money or value.
Thus, there may be intrinsic qualities of sexual labor that violate
human rights norms, notwithstanding governing national law or its
legitimacy as an economic practice.
VII. CONCLUSION
We conclude that the labor rights framework enables
negotiations of seemingly irreconcilable conceptions of sexual labor,
as either coercion or as work, to create common ground for law and
policy. Accepting that prostitution can be a choice and a means for
economic sustenance does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
the response must be legalization and legitimization. To the contrary,
if we look to the intersection of human and labor rights, we find
moral frameworks, political understandings, and legal tools for
resisting forms of work that endanger or exploit the worker, that
recreate relationships of bondage, and that endanger the interests of
labor and of women as a political class.
If, by these standards, sexual labor is a form of exploitative
labor, it is properly subject to pressures for abolition based on human
rights norms. Karl Marx considered every employment contract a
contract of prostitution because of the exploitative nature of the sale
of labor power: "prostitution is only a specific expression of the
general prostitution of the labourer."°7 Thus, Marx suggests, as have
other participants in the current debate over sex work, that there is
nothing wrong with prostitution that is not also wrong with other
forms of work.
Here we have limited ourselves to the question of sexual
labor as a commodity in the market. But we hope our inquiry spurs
parallel consideration of the issue of exploitative labor for adults
working in other labor settings under conditions that degrade dignity
and harm the individual. The prostitute served in the past as a
symbol of workers' degradation; in the future she may stand as the
207. Karl Marx, Private Property and Communism, in The Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, at v (Martin Milligan trans., 1959) (1932),
available at http://www.marxists.orgarchive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/
comm.htm.
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worker whose conditions spurred ambitious developments of the idea
of labor rights as human rights.
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